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  This paper, by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Malmquist Productivity Index, 
addresses the impacts of 2007 global financial crisis on the efficiency and productivity of 
Turkish banks, during 2003-2010 periods. Moreover, a risk taking measure is introduced for 
each bank and two-stage regression is used to analyze the determinants of DEA efficiency 
scores. However, because of the existence of inherent dependency among DEA efficiency 
scores, the basic assumption of regression analysis, i.e., independence within the sample is 
violated. Hence, to overcome the dependency problem and to be able to make valid statistical 
inferences, bootstrapping method is applied. This paper attempts to extend the existing DEA 
literature by applying some of the remarkable methods suggested to improve DEA efficiency 
and productivity estimates altogether, for the case of Turkey to observe the impacts of recent 
2007 global financial crisis. 
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Özet – Türk Bankalarında Etkinlik, Verimlilik ve Risk Analizi: Bootstrap Veri  
     Zarflama Analizi Yaklaşımı 
  Bu makale, Veri Zarflama Analizi (VZA) ve Malmquist Üretkenlik Endeksi’ni kullanarak 2007 
küresel ekonomik krizinin Türk Bankacılık Sektörü üzerindeki etkilerini 2003-2010 dönemi 
boyunca incelemiştir. Ayrıca, risk ölçümü amacıyla her banka için risk ölçüsü tanımlanmış ve 
VZA yöntemiyle elde edilmiş olan etkinlik skorlarının belirleyicilerini analiz etmek amacıyla iki 
adımlı regresyon yapılmıştır. Ancak VZA etkinlik skorları arasındaki bağımlılık sebebiyle, 
regresyon analizinin temel varsayımlarından biri olan örneklemin bağımsızlığı ihlal edilmiştir. Bu 
nedenle, söz konusu ihlali gidermek ve analizden geçerli istatistiksel çıkarımlar yapabilmek 
amacıyla analizde bootstrapping yöntemi uygulanmıştır. Bu makale, VZA etkinlik ve üretkenlik 
endekslerini geliştirmek amacıyla literatürde önerilen dikkate değer bazı metodları, 2007 
krizinin Türkiye üzerindeki etkilerini incelemek amacıyla bir arada uygulayarak mevcut DEA 
literatürüne katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Veri Zarflama Analizi, Malmquist Üretkenlik Endeksi, Etkinlik ve Üretkenlik, 
         Bootstrapping 
JEL Sınıflaması: C14, G21, G14, C23 
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1 1. Introduction 
  During the last few decades, Turkish economy has undergone a transformation 
period consisting series of reforms to pass from a centralized economy to a well-
integrated market economy. During 1980s, which is characterized by financial 
deregulation, series of financial reforms were implemented in order to limit the 
state intervention and to enhance the role of market forces. Moreover, the 
determination of Turkey to become a permanent member of European Union (EU) 
in this period motivated banking authorities to implement regulations that are in 
harmony with those in EU (Isik and Hassan, 2003). As a result of those reforms, 
new entrants to the market were allowed, new types of financial institutions 
emerged, new banking products were introduced and interest and foreign 
exchange rates were permitted to fluctuate. 
  With this new framework, banks’ scope of intermediation activities had 
extended through the introduction of asset-backed securities, mutual funds, 
interest and currency rate forwards and swaps, repo transactions, trading in 
government and private securities, consumer credits and financial consultation. 
Moreover, as domestic market opened up, Turkish banks gained interest in 
opening up branches and representative offices abroad.  
  The new liberal era brought about strong incentives for Turkish banks to 
compete internationally through terminating their unprofitable ventures, investing 
into heavy technology and using their resources more efficiently. In such an 
environment where competitive pressures dominate, the efficiency and 
productivity of banks have gain particular importance in the establishment of solid 
financial system which is mainly composed of banks. In other words, measuring 
the level of efficiency and detecting the causes of inefficiency would be highly 
essential for bank managers and regulators in order to survive in the new 
regulatory framework in which inefficient banks would be driven out or acquired 
by efficient banks. 
  Following the financial deregulation, during 1990-2000, instabilities in the 
global economy had increased significantly. More specifically, global capital flows 
accelerated and Turkish economy was often exposed to currency crisis in this 
period. The weak growth performance, high public sector imbalances, high and Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 73
volatile inflation combined with current account deficit gave way to February 2001 
crisis, eventually. However, soon after the crisis, in May 2001, The Banking Sector 
Restructuring Program was put into effect. The aim is the restructuring of public 
banks, resolution of banks taken over by Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF), 
rehabilitation of private banking system, strengthening the surveillance and 
supervision frame, increasing competition and efficiency in the sector. Due to the 
crisis, 22 banks were transferred to SDIF in this period. The cost of restructuring of 
those banks and public banks was USD 53,6 billion, a one third of national 
income.   
  Thanks to measures taken after the crisis, the sector had improved rapidly. In 
the post crisis period, the amount of nonperforming loans contracted while loans 
had expanded. The sector’s free capital base exhibited a constant growth, 
profitability increased and gained a sustainable quality, while the deposit and loan 
interest rates decreased rapidly, burden on credit customer (i.e. intermediation 
costs) decreased. This trend had continued up to mid-2006. However, mid-2006 
onwards increased financial globalization, rise in the type and the number of 
complex financial instruments (i.e. derivatives) where the risks are further 
decomposed and transferred caused recurrent turbulences on a world wide scale. 
Those turbulences finally gave way to 2007 global financial crisis which is also 
experienced by Turkey. 
  The initial impact of the crisis has been on the contraction of liquidity and 
credit channels. Due to the squeeze in financial conditions and decrease in 
demand, growth performance decreased, unemployment increased and 
expectations worsened all over the world. However, several measures were put 
into effect following the crisis. In order to increase system’s liquidity, Central 
Banks declined interest rates and launched programs to strengthen the capital 
adequacy of financial institutions. In Turkey, depending on the decreased trade 
volume and economic slowdown, the banking sector has faced with a decrease in 
credit growth, deterioration in asset quality and an increase in non-performing 
loan ratio. Banks began to decrease volume of loans which is more risky now 
meanwhile, increase the volume of their securities portfolio. Moreover, since the 
funding sources from abroad has squeezed, banks began to rely on more volatile 
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maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities (i.e. long term loans funded with 
short term deposits). However, a series of measures have been implemented by 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey-CBRT (macro level) and Banking Regulation 
and Supervision Agency-BRSA (micro level) to mitigate the impacts of the crisis. 
Macro level measures include, CBRT’s resume of its activities as an intermediary in 
the foreign exchange (FX) deposit market, raising of transaction limits twice and 
extending the lending maturity from 1 week to 1 month in FX deposit market, 
reducing reserve requirement ratio for FX liabilities and increasing the exports 
rediscount credit limit. Micro level measures implemented by BRSA include, 
subjecting banks to get permission for the distribution of 2008 earnings, allowing 
banks to reclassify the securities in their balance sheet from trading portfolio to 
investment portfolio for once only and allowing banks to restructure the loans 
apparently posing no problems in order to ensure smooth functioning of the loan 
relations between banks and non-financial institutions.   
  As summarized so far, during the last three decades, continuous legal and 
structural changes were occurred not only in Turkish financial sector, but also all 
over the world’s financial systems. However, the point is that although financial 
sector has undergone rapid changes all around the globe, the efficiency and 
productivity research has not kept pace with these recent changes in terms of 
scope and up-to-dateness.  
  In this field, several number of papers have been published in which the 
efficiency and productivity of Turkish banking sector has been studied. Zaim and 
Ertuğrul (1996) is one of the preceeding papers investigating the effects of 
financial liberalization on Turkish banking sector in the period of 1981-1990 by 
using Data Envelopment Analysis. The result suggests that differences in bank 
efficiency scores are eliminated during liberalization. Similarly, Jackson et al. 
(1998) examines the impacts of financial liberalization policies adopted in 1980 on 
bank efficiency and productivity during 1992-1996, by using Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI)
1 and finds that in general 
Turkish banking sector experienced productivity growth with the exception of 
1993-94, and that private and foreign banks showed greater productivity growth 
                                                            
1 Hereafter DEA is used as an abbreviation for Data Envelopment Analysis and MPI is used as an abbreviation for 
Malmquist Productivity Index. Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 75
compared to state owned banks. Cingi and Tarım (2000) study the efficiency of 
banking sector between 1989 and 1996 by employing DEA and reported that 
there is high degree of concentration in the sector and the inefficiency of public 
banks could be attributed to scale inefficiencies. Isik and Hassan (2003) investigate 
the performance of Turkish banks during 1981-1990 period by using DEA and 
MPI. The results suggest that the average managerial efficiency in Turkish banks 
has substantially improved after deregulation. More recently, Aras and Kurt 
(2007), use DEA to analyze the efficiency of banks operating in Turkey, in the 
period of 1992-2003 and concludes that banks transferred to SDIF had extreme 
and low efficiency scores and they had been carrying out high risk before 
transferred.   
  This study, on the other hand, presents an empirical analysis of the relative 
efficiency, productivity and risk-taking tendency of Turkish banking system before 
and after the 2007 global financial crisis by using a rich panel data set observed 
during 2003-2010 periods. The methods used to assess relative efficiency and 
productivity are DEA and MPI. This paper differs from other papers on Turkish 
banking sector in some respects. First, after calculating efficiency and productivity 
measures through DEA method, a procedure called bootstrapping that permits to 
estimate bias corrected efficiency scores and productivity indices is applied in order 
to obtain bias corrected efficiency and productivity scores. Although the method is 
widely used in papers investigating bank performances of various developed and 
developing countries, there are few studies for the case of Turkey. Secondly, since 
efficiency measures are not sufficient to assess the overall performance of a bank, 
a risk-taking measure based on Laeven (1997) remarkable study on DEA is 
introduced in order to estimate risk appetite of banks. Thirdly, fixed effects panel 
data regression analysis has been used to analyze the determinants of DEA 
efficiency scores. Finally, the study aims to find out the impacts of recent financial 
crisis on the Turkish banking sector. The study covers a time period which is not 
examined and fulfilled with adequate number of studies yet. In over all, this paper 
attempts to extend the DEA literature by bringing together some of the methods 
suggested to improve DEA efficiency and productivity estimates for the case of 
Turkey in order to observe the impacts of recent 2007 global financial crisis. Müge DİLER 76
  The results that are strongly supported by the September, 2007 global financial 
crisis indicate that during 2003-2008, efficiency and productivity of Turkish 
banking sector had improved gradually and uninterruptedly, however in 2008-
2009 sudden decreases in efficiency and productivity are detected. From 2009 to 
2010, we, however, observe gradual recovery. Another finding is that return on 
assets has the largest positive impact on the efficiency whereas GDP growth and 
the ratio of nonperforming loans to total assets have the largest negative impact 
on efficiency scores, respectively. Also the risk taking measure indicates that in the 
pre crisis period banking sector’s risk taking measure is positive but in the post 
crisis period it is negative depending on the reduced efficiency scores.   
  The organization of the paper is as follows: The next chapter is devoted to the 
survey of DEA and MPI literature. Chapter 3 explains the methodology used to 
measure bank efficiency and productivity. Chapter 4 provides information on the 
data used and describes the main variables employed in the efficiency model and 
in the regression. Chapter 5 discusses empirical results of the analysis. Finally, 
Chapter 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Survey  
  Next sub section, summarizes the existing literature on DEA technique, and the 
following sub section summarizes the literature on Malmquist Productivity Index.  
2.1. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
  In the literature, there are two empirical ways to measure efficiency: non 
parametric programming introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) and parametric 
stochastic frontier technique introduced by Aigner et al. (1977). The most popular 
non parametric technique is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the most 
popular parametric technique is Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). The 
fundamental difference between both techniques is that the non parametric 
techniques involve use of linear programming methods to construct a non-
parametric piece-wise frontier whereas parametric techniques postulate a 
parametric frontier, based on a behavioral maximization hypothesis and assume 
that maximizing behavior is present and that it is exhibited by the most efficient 
firms in the sample.  However, as argued by Laeven (1997), often there do not 
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  In fact, there is no consensus in the literature to use either DEA or SFA in the 
measurement of efficiency. The main advantage of DEA over SFA is that DEA can 
be used even when conventional cost and profit functions that depend on 
optimizing reactions to prices cannot be justified (Laeven, 1997).  Another 
advantage of DEA, as pointed out by Amoda and Dyson (2006), is that if the 
specific functional form chosen for the stochastic production frontier does not 
represent the actual technology, the specification bias may lead to misleading 
efficiency measurements. On the contrary, since DEA involves the use of linear 
programming methods to construct a non-parametric piece-wise frontier over the 
data, efficiency measures that are calculated relative to this frontier will not carry a 
specification bias and hence will be more accurate.   
  As pointed by Schmidt (1986), opponents of DEA claim that DEA estimates 
give only an upper bound to efficiency measures, it does not assume statistical 
noise, which means that all the the error term in the estimation is attributed to 
inefficiency and so tend to underestimate efficiency scores and efficiency scores 
generated by DEA are not very robust and are highly sensitive to sample selection, 
that’s to say DEA efficiency scores are dependent on each other due to the nature 
of the estimation technique which is based on the construction of  best practice 
frontier from the sample in hand to assess relative performance.  
  However, to remove those anomalies inherent in DEA estimators and to be 
able to make statistical inferences based on DEA estimates, in their challenging 
studies Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999, 2000) developed various measures based 
on the idea of bootstrapping initially proposed by Efron (1979). Moreover, Wilson 
(2008) developed a distinguished software package called Frontier Efficiency 
Analysis with R (FEAR) that incorporates the idea of bootstrapping to compute not 
only DEA estimates of technical, allocative and overall efficiency while assuming 
either variable, non-increasing or constant returns to scale but also MPIs and scale 
efficiency measures. In their papers, Xue and Harker (1999) and Casu and 
Molyneux (2000) also use bootstrapping to overcome the inherent dependency of 
DEA efficiency scores. Based on those challenging works, this paper uses DEA and 
employs bootstrapping method in the measurement of efficiency and productivity. 
  In the DEA literature, determination of choice variables, namely bank inputs 
and outputs deserves particular attention because it significantly affects the Müge DİLER 78
results. There are two different approaches that dominate DEA literature: 
production and intermediation approach
2.    
  Under the production approach, pioneered by Benston (1965), a financial 
institution is defined as a producer of services for account holders, that is, they 
perform transactions on deposit accounts and process documents such as loans. 
Hence, according to this approach, the number of accounts or its related 
transactions is the best measure for output, while the number of employees and 
physical capital are considered as inputs (Sufian, 2009). In the intermediation 
approach, however, banks are regarded as intermediators that accumulate 
deposits and other funds and transfer such funds to loans and other interest 
income producing assets. In this approach, banks’ total loans and securities are 
assumed as outputs whereas deposits along with physical capital and labor are 
assumed as inputs. Moreover, under this approach, in contrast to the production 
approach, monetary values of accounts are used as choice variables.  
  More recently, there are several studies employing mixed approach in terms of 
the definition of bank inputs and outputs. In the mixed approach, banks are 
regarded as enterprises providing intermediation services and meanwhile 
engaging in production. Thus, under this approach measurement of inputs and 
outputs do not comply with either of the two previously mentioned approaches.  
  In the light of those approaches, this paper, regards banks as financial 
institutions trying to maximize profit through competition in the deposits and loan 
markets. On this basis, some leading indicator ratios regarding profitability, 
income, loans and deposits are used as bank inputs and outputs. In this approach, 
since a bank is regarded as a competitor, that’s to say, producer of loans and 
deposits in the market, the study complies with the production approach. 
However, the data used in this study are not represented in terms of account 
numbers as in the production approach, but in terms of monetary values as in the 
intermediation approach. On the other hand, by using monetary values to form 
ratios the study diverges from intermediation approach, either. Therefore, the 
inputs and outputs used in this study should be classified under the mixed 
approach.   
                                                            
2 Besides those two major approaches there are also asset, user-cost and value added approaches used in various 
studies in the DEA literature. For detailed discussion of the issue see Favero and Papi (1995).Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 79
  There are number of papers aiming to measure efficiency of banks by using 
DEA technique. However, in DEA literature, different input and output 
combinations are used in the calculation of bank efficiency. Table below 
summarizes those combinations used in selected studies of the banking literature.   
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    As depicted in Table-1, one of the preceding papers for Turkey is prepared by 
Zaim and Ertuğrul (1996). The paper investigates the effects of financial 
liberalization on Turkish banking sector in the period of 1981-1990 by using DEA. 
The paper adopts value added approach that considers balance sheet items with a 
substantial share of value added as outputs (i.e. both deposits and loans are 
considered as outputs) in the identification of inputs and outputs and finds that 
differences in bank efficiency scores are eliminated during liberalization. Similarly, 
Jackson et al. (1998) examines the impacts of financial liberalization policies 
adopted in 1980 on bank efficiency and productivity during 1992-1996, by using 
DEA and employing value added approach and finds that in general Turkish 
banking sector experienced productivity growth with the exception of 1993-94, 
due to the impacts of economic crisis and that private and foreign banks showed 
greater productivity growth compared to state owned banks. 
  In contrast to the previous studies, Cingi and Tarım (2000) adopt production 
approach in the identification of inputs and outputs and instead of monetary 
values, the study uses various ratios regarding the banking sector to observe the 
impacts of financial deregulation. The period under consideration is 1989-1996. 
Their finding supports Jackson et al. (1998) by concluding that in overall, the 
performance of private banks is higher than that of state owned banks and that 
inefficiency of public banks could be attributed to scale inefficiencies.  In the same 
way, Çolak and Altan (2002) assume production approach and use various ratios 
in the measurement of Turkish banking sector efficiency during the 1999-2000 
period. 
  More recently, Isik and Hassan (2003) investigate the performance of Turkish 
banks during 1981-1990 period, however by adopting intermediation approach. 
Besides what has been done in the previous studies, this paper also takes into 
consideration bank’s off balance sheet items, loans to special sectors, inter-bank 
funds and investment securities in the calculation of efficiency. The results suggest 
that the average managerial efficiency in Turkish banks has substantially improved 
after deregulation. The decline in the level of efficiency during the initial years of 
financial deregulation is attributed to the strong increases in input volumes of 
banks and financial distress experienced because of some broker-age house and 
bank failures between 1983 and 1984. However, this period was followed by Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 81
rapid growth in efficiency which is to some extent due to the utilization of idle 
capacity created in the advent of deregulation.   
  Similar to what is assumed in this study, a paper prepared by Aras and Kurt 
(2007) also assumes mixed approach and uses various ratios in the assessment of 
the performance of Turkish banks in the period of 1992-2003. In addition to 
previous studies, the paper takes into account bank risk factors in measuring the 
efficiency and finds out that banks transferred to SDIF had extreme loan growth 
and low efficiency scores and they had been carrying out high risk before 
transferred. 
  Besides the studies examining the Turkish banking sector, there are also several 
studies investigating the efficiency of various developed and developing countries 
banking systems as well, as summarized in Table-1. In addition to measuring 
banking sector efficiency by using DEA, in the studies of Favero and Papi (1995), 
Laeven (1997), Casu and Molyneux (2000), Rezitis (2006) and Thangavelu and 
Findlay (2010), a two-stage regression analysis is used to analyze the determinants 
of DEA efficiency scores as a second stage of the analysis.  
  In addition, in its remarkable study, Laeven (1997) introduces risk measure 
which is ignored by DEA efficiency estimators in order to fully take into account 
East Asian banks’ performances during the pre-crisis period of 1992-96. The results 
suggest that foreign owned banks were among the most risky banks, together 
with company owned banks and that restructured banks after the 1997 crisis 
were the banks that had excessive loan growths. 
  Casu and Molyneux (2000), on the other hand, extend the existing literature by 
applying bootstrapping technique to efficiency estimators obtained by DEA in 
order to remove inherent dependency problem of DEA efficiency scores. The 
paper investigates whether the productive efficiency of European banking systems 
has improved and converged towards a common European frontier between 1993 
and 1997, following the process of EU legislative harmonization. They find that 
since the EU’s single market programme, there has been a small improvement in 
bank efficiency levels, although there is little evidence to suggest that these have 
converged and that efficiency differences across European banking markets 
appear to be mainly determined by country-specific factors. Müge DİLER 82
  This paper, however, after obtaining DEA efficiency and MPI productivity scores 
of Turkish banks at the first stage of the analysis, applies bootstrapping technique 
to remove inherent dependency problem and to be able to make valid statistical 
inferences based on those estimates and uses two-stage regression analysis at the 
second stage to find out determinants of bank efficiency. Moreover, based on 
Laeven’s work, a risk taking measure is introduced for each bank. Therefore, this 
paper attempts to extend the DEA literature by bringing all the methods discussed 
above together for the case of Turkey in order to observe the impacts of recent 
2007 global financial crisis.   
2.2. Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI)  
  The Malmquist productivity index is used to measure and compare the 
productivity growth of different producing units from one period to another. 
Measurement is based on constructing best practice frontiers for adjacent years by 
using data on inputs and outputs of all producing units in the sample and then 
computing the output growth that is caused by shift of the frontier for each 
individual producing unit. What distinguishes MPI from the other alternative 
productivity indices such as Törnquist and Fischer is that since it is composed of 
distance functions it does not require any information on prices to calculate the 
productivity. That is, MPI is based only on quantity data and does not make any 
assumption on the functional form for the technology employed. Hence, MPI is 
considered as superior to alternative indices, particularly in cases when researcher 
does not have any information regarding prices. 
  Another advantage of MPI is that since it can be decomposed into two 
components, one which measures changes in technical efficiency (i.e. whether 
firms are getting closer to the production frontier over time), and one which 
measures changes in technology (i.e. whether the production frontier is moving 
outwards over time), it can provide additional insights. 
  MPI is named after Stan Malmquist's (1953) study. The path breaking paper 
that was proposed by Caves et al. (1982a) redefined the index as a ratio of 
distance functions and later, Fare et al. (1989b) showed how this index could be 
calculated by using non parametric linear programming methods. As a result of 
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Based on those papers, Caves et al. (1982a, 1982b) showed how MPI could be 
decomposed into two as efficiency change and technical change. Ray and Desli 
(1997) has further decomposed MPI as technical change, efficiency change and 
scale efficiency change. More recently, based on the inverse relationship between 
output distance functions and output oriented technical efficiency measures, Fare 
et al. (1994b) proposed a method to calculate the MPI relative to non parametric 
frontier.   
  Those successful theoretical studies are followed by large number of applied 
studies in various fields. Up to now, MPI has been applied to public sector, 
agriculture, banking, electric utilities, transportation, insurance companies, 
agriculture and countries to measure productivity.   
  In the literature, MPI has been widely used in measuring the productivity of 
banking sector as well. In this field, the first attempt came from Berg et al. (1992). 
They searched for the impacts of deregulation on the productivity of the 
Norwegian banks throughout 1980's. The results indicate that while the banking 
sector experienced deterioration during the first years of deregulation, an 
improvement is observed in the following years. 
  Following this first attempt, several papers measuring total factor productivity 
growth of Turkish banking sector by using MPI technique are published. One of 
the preceding papers for Turkey is prepared by Jackson et al. (1998). The paper 
aims to analyze the technical efficiency and productivity change over the period 
1992-1996, following the financial deregulation, by utilizing DEA and MPI. The 
paper concludes that in general Turkish banking sector experienced productivity 
growth with the exception of 1993-94, due to the impacts of the economic crisis. 
Another finding is that among the three ownership types, private and foreign 
banks showed greater productivity growth compared to the state owned banks. 
  Cingi and Tarım (2000) examined the total factor productivity growth of 
Turkish banking sector by using MPI during 1989-1996. Their finding supports the 
previous work by concluding that in overall, the performance of private banks is 
higher than that of state owned banks. Another paper in this field is prepared by 
Isik and Hassan (2003). Similar to the previous studies, by using MPI, they 
investigate the effects of financial deregulation on all banks operating in Turkey Müge DİLER 84
during 1981-1990 period. Their findings suggest that all form of Turkish banks 
have recorded significant productivity gains driven mostly by efficiency increases 
rather than technical progress and that private banks began to close their 
performance gap with public banks in the new environment.    
  More recently, Karacabey and Arslan (2004) applied MPI technique to 43 
Turkish commercial banks over the period 1997-2000. The results indicate that 
most banks experienced productivity loss due to the negative technological 
change during the entire period. The results of the productivity change analysis 
according to banks' ownership structures and scales shows that all the groups 
experienced similar production changes, which indeed indicates that the banks 
productivity change is mainly a consequence of the domestic economy's cycles. 
Öncü and Aktaş (2007), measure the changes in total factor productivity of 
Turkish banks over 2001-2005, during the restructuring period of Turkish banking 
sector. This study finds that Turkish banks experienced productivity gains in 2001-
2005 period, which was mainly attributed to technical progress rather than 
efficiency increases.  
  Ceyhan (2007) and Aysan and Ceyhan (2008) are the other remarkable studies 
applying MPI technique to measure productivity. Ceyhan’s 2007 paper aims to 
find the effects of globalization on the performance of Turkish banking sector 
during 1990-2006, with an emphasis to the period after 2001 crisis. By using MPI 
and its mutually exclusive and exhaustive components of efficiency and 
technological changes and by further decomposing efficiency change component 
into two as pure technical and scale efficiency changes, the paper finds that the 
productivity of the banking sector have increased due to the technological 
improvement. Moreover, with respect to ownership, foreign banks were the most 
efficient group until 2001 after which state banks captured the first place and 
with respect to size, before 2000, the most efficient bank group was the medium-
scale banks.  
  Similarly, Aysan and Ceyhan (2008) aims to measure the productivity change of 
Turkish banks as a result of increasing foreign bank entry, during 1990-2006 with 
MPI, by using a sample of 20 commercial banks. The study concludes that Turkish 
economy experienced productivity increase which is predominantly attributed to 
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1990 and 2001. After 2000, however, the productivity increase was solely due to 
technological improvement reflecting the existence of structural changes in the 
Turkish banking sector. Also, after 2000, pure technical efficiency of the sector 
increased reflecting the fact that the quality of bank management has been of 
increasing importance.   
  The literature survey on MPI reveals that MPI is an efficient way of measuring 
the total factor productivity change from one period to another and it allows to 
find the main sources of improvement in the productivity, as well. 
3. Methodology  
  This chapter describes the methodology used in this paper to measure bank 
efficiency and productivity. The first sub section is devoted to DEA. The following 
sub section describes the methodology underlying bootstrapping technique. 
Finally, the last sub section explains the methodology of MPI. 
3.1. DEA Technique 
  In a simple production technology, there exist two main variables, namely 
inputs and outputs. On this basis, a multi-input and multi-output production 
technology involving N number of inputs and M number of outputs could be 
defined as follows:    
(3.1.1)                             ^ ` (,) :    
MN T x y R x can produce y

               
where 
N
N R x x x     ) ,..., ( 1  represents vector of inputs and 
M
M R y y y     ) ,..., ( 1  represents the vector of outputs. Intuitively, production set 
T consists of all combinations of inputs and outputs such that x can produce y. 
  Production technology could equivalently be represented by output set (also 
known as production possibility set) which is defined as: 
(3.1.2)                                    ^ `   T y x    R y   x P
M      ) , ( : ) (    
  Given the notation presented above, we now move onto the definition of 
output distance function which is very useful tool in describing the technology in 
such a way that it enables us to measure efficiency and productivity in a reliable 
manner. Distance function is simply based on radial contractions and expansions. 
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Malmquist (1953) and Shephard (1953) introduced this notion, independently in 
their own studies. The advantage of using distance functions is that it allows 
defining multi input and multi output production technology without the need to 
specify a behavioral objective such as cost minimization or profit maximization 
(Coelli et al., 2005).  A researcher could either use input or output distance 
functions depending on the objective of the analysis. Particularly, input distance 
function concentrates on the idea of minimal proportional contraction of the input 
vector, given the output vector whereas output distance function concentrates on 
the idea of maximal proportional expansion of the output vector, given the input 
vector. In this paper, since banks are regarded as decision making units trying to 
maximize their profits (i.e. outputs) given the funds available (i.e. inputs), it would 
be more appropriate to use output oriented DEA. Hence, given the input vector, 
one can define the output distance function as follows: 
(3.1.3)         ^`   x P y   y x DO ) ( ) ( : min ) , (    P P     
where  1 ) , ( 0 d d y x DO .
3 Choice of orientation to calculate the efficiency is not 
the end of the story. Since it is possible to have firms that are efficient both 
technically and allocatively but that are not operating at an optimal scale, one 
should also be careful in choosing the appropriate returns to scale technology that 
will be applied in the analysis.  
  Efficiency could either be estimated assuming constant returns to scale (CRS), 
variable returns to scale (VRS) or non increasing returns to scale (NIRS) 
technology
4. However, the CRS assumption holds when all banks are operating at 
an optimal scale, but this becomes very unrealistic when imperfect competition, 
government regulations, constraints on finance etc. are considered. Moreover, 
assuming CRS, when not all banks are operating at an optimal scale would result 
in technical efficiency measures confounded by scale efficiencies (Coelli et al., 
2005). Hence, in such cases, it would be more appropriate to assume VRS yielding 
technical efficiency estimates that are free of scale efficiency effects.  
                                                            
3 Efficiency scores could either be estimated by using Shephard or Farrell distance functions. Since Farrell distance 
functions are nothing more than the inverse of Shephard distance functions, a researcher could use any one of them. 
In this study, efficiency scores are calculated in terms of Shephard distance functions. 
4 For graphical representation and detailed discussion of the issue see Diler (2009).Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 87
  Another advantage of VRS specification over the CRS is that this approach 
forms a convex hull of intersecting planes that envelope the data points more 
closely than the CRS and NIRS conical hull. Moreover, the more developed 
banking system is, the more likely it is that the banks face non-constant returns to 
scale (McAllister and McManus, 1993 and Wheelock and Wilson, 1995).In terms 
of banking, some papers use CRS approach with the motivation of being more 
conservative in the measurement of bank efficiency scores, because efficiency 
scores obtained under CRS assumption would certainly be smaller than scores 
obtained under VRS assumption. However, when we estimate efficiency scores 
under two approaches we observe that the scores are very close to each other. 
Therefore, for the reasons explained above, in this paper we assume VRS for the 
Turkish banking sector
5. 
  Based on the notation explained so far and the discussion above, the DEA 
model that is used in this paper could be formulated as follows: 
  Assume that there exist  K k ,... 1   observations in the sample. Hence, given 
our data set, for VRS specification, an output set that holds for every period and 
for all observations can be constructed in the following way: 
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5 Several number of papers aiming to measure bank efficiency in the literature adopts VRS assumption. For the 
detailed discussion of the issue, see McAllister and McManus (1993), Wheelock and Wilson, (1995), Sufian (2009), 
Casu and Molyneux (2000). 
6 It is the direct consequence of strong disposability of outputs. For a detailed discussion see Fare and  
Grosskopf (1998-2000).  
7 Convexity constraint that imposes the VRS assumption . It ensures that an inefficient firm is only 
benchmarked against firms of a similar size. That’s, the projected point for that firm on the DEA 
frontier is a convex combination of observed firms.  Müge DİLER 88
where zk 's stand for the intensity variables (weights) assigned to each observation 
while constructing the production set. Thus, given the production set and 
constraints specified above, the fractional programming problem that should be 
solved by DEA (i.e. output oriented VRS DEA model) for each k, would be as 
follows: 
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  However, the software used in the analysis is designed to solve only linear 
programming problems. So, the algorithm transforms the fractional programming 
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8 The fractional programming problem in (3.1.5) and the linear programming problem in (3.1.6) are trivially identical. 
However, (3.1.5) is transformed into (3.1.6) through ș = 1/μ, to make it linear. 
9 The linear programming model discussed here is originally developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978, 1979) 
and is known as CCR model. This model measures the efficiency under CRS assumption. Based on this study, Banker et 
al. (1984) extended the CCR model by relaxing the CRS assumption. The resulting “BCC” model uses VRS assumption. 
In this paper, we assume VRS in the linear programming problem to be solved for each bank to obtain efficiency 
scores. For the transition of linear programming problem from the CCR model to the linear programming model based 
on Shephard distance function see Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984).Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 89
  By taking the inverse of efficiency score obtained from (3.1.6.), the algorithm 
returns the output oriented Shephard distance function, namely Do(x,y) which lies 
between zero and one, for each bank. 
3.2. B Bootstrapping 
  More recently, in their 1998 and 2000 papers, for multi-input and multi-output 
model, Simar and Wilson suggested the use of bootstrapping technique which 
was originally developed by Efron (1979) in order to be able to assess statistical 
properties of non-parametric efficiency estimates derived from some unobservable 
data generating process, to remove inherent dependency among efficiency scores 
and eventually to obtain bias corrected DEA efficiency scores. 
  To begin with, suppose a data generating process (DGP), M   generating a 
random sample of: 
(3.2.1.)                                  ^`   K k y x   S k k ,... 1 : ) , (                                
  By some method M, this sample defines estimators of T and  ) (x P  discussed in 
the previous section, namely T ˆ and ) ( ˆx P . Given those, for kth observation, the 
output oriented technical efficiency score at point  k k y x , can be calculated as 
follows:   
(3.2.2)                                   ^ `   ) ( ˆ :   max ˆ x P y k    T T T       
which is the estimator of the true but unobserved population efficiency score  k T . 
The problem is that sampling distributions of T ˆ and ) ( ˆx P  could not be inferred 
because  M  is unknown and the complexity of M makes it almost impossible to 
determine it. However, bootstrapping technique which is based on the idea that 
there exists a consistent estimator of , M  namely  M ˆ , enables us to obtain 
consistent estimators of T and  ) (x P , even though M  is unknown. 
  Now, suppose that, given the sample S, by using our knowledge, we can 
produce a consistent estimator of M  namely,M ˆ . Then, consider another sample 
* S  which is generated by M ˆ  through random resamplings with replacement from 
S. Formally, Müge DİLER 90
(3.2.3)                                      ^ `   K k y x   S k k ,... 1 : ) , (
* * *      
  Similar to S, by some method M, this pseudo sample also defines 
corresponding estimators of T and P(x) that are 
* ˆ T and
* ) ( ˆx P respectively. Thus, 
for any pair of  ) , (
* *
k k y x , the corresponding output oriented technical efficiency 
score is given by: 
(3.2.4)                                     ^ `   x P y   k
* * ) ( ˆ : max ˆ    T T T  
  Expression (3.2.4) could equivalently be defined as a linear programming 
problem: 
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In this case, however, since the underlying DGP, M ˆ   is already known,  the 
sampling distributions of the estimators 
* ˆ T and
* ) ( ˆx P are completely known, 
although it may be difficult to estimate analytically. Nevertheless, the sampling 
distributions could easily be approximated by Monte Carlo methods. The steps of 
the approximation can be summarized as follows: 
  1. Use  M ˆ   to generate B number of pseudo samples such that 
*
b S , where 
. ,... 1 B b    
2. Apply M to each of those samples and obtain the estimators ୠכ
̰  and ሺሻୠכ
̰  
for  . ,... 1 B b    
3. Obtain 
* ˆ
kb T for each k, where  K k ,... 1   and  . ,... 1 B b    Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 91




which is nothing more than the Monte Carlo approximation of the distribution of 
* ˆ
kb T conditional onM ˆ . Intuitively, by repeatedly simulating or mimicking the DGP 
through resampling with replacement and through applying the original estimator 
to each simulated sample, we could approximate the sampling distributions of the 
original estimator.  
  Given the assumption
10 that M ˆ  is a consistent estimator of M ,  the bootstrap 
method concludes that the known bootstrap distributions obtained by the 
procedure described above will mimic the original unknown sampling distributions 
of the estimators of interest (Simar and Wilson, 1998)
11. More formally, 
(3.2.6)       k k T T ˆ ˆ*  ŇM ˆ   ̱    k k T T  ˆ Ň M  
  That’s to say, within the true world,  k T ˆ is an estimator of  k T  based on the 
sample S, generated from some DGP, M  whereas, in the bootstrap world, 
* ˆ
k T  is 
an estimator of  k T ˆ based on the sample S
* generated fromM ˆ . On this basis, we 
can estimate:   
(3.2.7)       k k k E bias T T M M    ˆ
,  
by using its bootstrap estimate given by:     
(3.2.8)       k k k E bias T T M M ˆ ˆ*
ˆ , ˆ     
which could be approximated by Monte Carlo realizations  
* ˆ
kb T  : 




as i b T T T T ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ *
1
*       ¦
 
         for  B b ,... 1    
Thus, bias corrected estimator of  k T ˆ  is given by: 
                                                            
10 See Hall (1992). 
11 For more detailed discussion and derivations, see Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000).Müge DİLER 92
(3.2.10)  
* ˆ 2 ˆ ˆ ~
k k k k k as i b T T T T        
The standard error of  k T ˆ can be estimated by: 
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The confidence interval for  k T  for some values  D a  and  D b given by: 
(3.2.12)     ^ ` D T T D D     d  d  1 ˆ   a       b     Prob k k  
can easily be calculated by using its bootstrap estimate for some bootstrap values 
*
D a  and 
*
D b which is given by: 
(3.2.13)               ^ ` D T T D D     d  d  1 ˆ ˆ * * * *   S      a       b     Prob k kb      for  B b ,... 1    
substituting 
*
D a  and 
*
D b , for  D a  and  D b   in (3.2.12), combined with (3.2.13) leads 
to the bootstrap approximation: 
(3.2.14)     ^ ` D T T D D  |  d  d  1 ˆ * * *         S     a       b    Prob k k     
Therefore, 
 (3.2.15)   
* * ˆ ˆ
D D T T T b             a k k k  d d   
 
3.3. Malmquist Productivity Index 
  Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) is the total factor productivity index that 
measures the change in total productivity of the factors between the two time 
periods by calculating the ratio between the distance from each point observed in 
the respective technology. There exists input and output oriented MPI introduced 
by Caves et al. (1982) which are composed of Shephard (1970) input and output Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 93
distance functions discussed in the previous section
12. Following Fare et al. 
(1994b), output oriented MPI used in this study based on output distance 
functions is defined as
13:                                                          
(3.3.1)         
1 1, , ,
  t t t t
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  A value of Mo greater than 1 indicates improvement in productivity whereas a 
value less than 1 indicates deterioration from time t to t+1. We must note that 
equation (3.3.1) is actually geometric mean of two indices. The first one is 
evaluated in relation to the technology of time t, and the second one relative to 
the technology of period t+1. Therefore, MPI can be decomposed into two 
different components, namely efficiency change (MEFFCH) and technical change 
(MTECH) defined as follows
14: 
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Equation (3.3.1) combined with (3.3.2) and (3.3.3), together imply that: 
(3.3.4)  






t MTECH MEFFCH M  
  The first component measures the change in technical efficiency between time 
t and t+1, and hence whether the production is getting closer to the best practice 
frontier for all observations in the sample (Zaim and Taşkın, 1997). The second 
component shows the shift in frontier between time t and t+1. Overall, index 
                                                            
12 In this section to conserve space, output oriented MPI is discussed. Input oriented MPI involves a straightforward 
translation of the notation explained in this section. 
13 ܦ଴
௧ାଵ(ݔ௧, ݕ௧) ,for example, measures the distance of bank at time t relative to the frontier at time t+1. Thus, the 
superscript on the distance function denotes the reference technology whereas superscripts on inputs and outputs 
denote the time period under consideration. 
14 For graphical representation and derivation of MPI components, see Diler (2009).Müge DİLER 94
values greater than one indicates improvement in productivity whereas values less 
than one indicates deterioration in productivity.  
  However, Fare et al. (1994b) further decomposed efficiency change 
component of equation (3.3.4) as pure efficiency change and scale efficiency 
change defined by: 
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  In this decomposition, efficiency change (MEFFCH) refers to efficiency change 
calculated under CRS assumption whereas pure efficiency change (PUREEFFCH) 
refers to efficiency change calculated under VRS. Therefore, scale efficiency 
change (SCALEEFFCH) corresponds to residual scale component which captures 
changes in the deviation between CRS and VRS technology. An improvement in 
efficiency which is attributed to the pure efficiency change, also known as 
managerial efficiency change, reflects managers’ correct policy making in 
allocating facilities and sources whereas an improvement in efficiency which is 
attributed to the scale efficiency change rather than pure efficiency change 
reflects that the firm is operating at the increasing returns to scale portion of its 
long run average cost curve and there is still room for this firm to benefit from 
economies of scale by expanding production. Similar to the other components of 
MPI, a value greater than one indicates improvement in that component whereas 
values less than one indicates deterioration. 
  Hence, (3.3.5) and (3.3.6) combined with (3.3.4) implies that, 
(3.3.7)  








t MTECH SCALEEFFCH PUREEFFCH M  
  The estimation of MPI requires the estimation of four different output distance 
functions explained in the previous section. However, similar to DEA estimators, 
MPI is also obtained by non parametric DGP based on the estimation of true but 
unobserved best practice frontier and this introduces dependency and bias to MPI, Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 95
as well. Hence, to remove this bias, based on their 1998 paper, Simar and Wilson 
(1999) suggested applying bootstrapping technique to MPI. The procedure is 
similar to the one explained for DEA estimators
15. In this context, bootstrapping 
technique provides confidence intervals for MPI that enable us to assess whether 
productivity changes as measured by the MPI are significant in a statistical sense. 
If it is significant, then the results imply a real change in productivity, otherwise it 
should be considered as nothing more than a trick of sampling noise. Therefore, in 
this paper bootstrapped, namely bias corrected, MPI obtained through 2000 
random resamplings is used to evaluate bank productivity. 
4 4. Data 
  The data used in this study are taken from The Bank Association of Turkey, 
which is a rich source for balance sheet and profit & loss account data for 
individual banks. The data is on 22 Turkish commercial deposit banks
16 for the 
years 2003-2010. 
  Given the data set, banks are divided into five groups as public banks, private 1 
banks, private 2 banks, private 3 banks and private 4 banks, according to their 
scale and size, placing the largest private banks into private 1 group and smallest 
banks into private 4 group
17. It is important to note that, this paper uses bank 
peer grouping developed especially for ratio analysis by BRSA for internal 
reporting systems and updated regularly according to the sights and reports of on-
site supervisory staff. The criteria in BRSA’s categorization are bank’s functioning 
group and its asset size. In this categorization banks are divided into 6 as public, 
investment and development, participation, private (private 1, 2, 3 and 4 based on 
asset size), SDIF and foreign bank branch. Only public and private banks are 
considered in the analysis. In this categorization, foreign banks that have only 
branches in Turkey are grouped under foreign bank branch category whereas 
foreign banks that have head offices in Turkey (like HSBC, ING and Citibank) are 
grouped under private banks category and placed into the appropriate private 
                                                            
15 For theory and methodology of estimating and bootstrapping MPI, see Simar and Wilson (1999). 
16 In DEA analysis, working with a sample including similar decision making units in terms of scale, size and ownership 
is essential for the sake of the analysis. Since incentives for managers to efficiently allocate resources might differ 
under different ownership arrangements, this study eliminates 6 foreign bank branches in total of 31 commercial 
banks. Also, one bank transferred to SDIF and 2 banks which should be considered as an outlier in terms of its inputs 
and outputs are eliminated from the analysis to obtain a homogeneous sample. Hence, we are left with 22 
commercial banks. 
17 Banking groups, together with banks covered, could be seen in Table 3 in the next section.Müge DİLER 96
bank group according to their asset sizes. Hence, based on BRSA’s peer grouping, 
in contrast to the studies on mainstream banking DEA literature, the foreign-
owned banks are not considered as a separate sub group in this paper
18.  
  The coverage of data is quite good. In terms of bank loans and deposits, the 
coverage of the total commercial banking system by our sample is about 90,8% 
for loans and 94,4% for deposits. In terms of number of commercial banks, the 
coverage by our sample is 68,8%.  
  Appendix A.1 and A.2 summarize the data used in this study. According to the 
data, during 2003-2010 period, Turkish banking sector experienced extreme loan 
growth (728,3%). Public banks and small scale private banks (private 4), were the 
banks that had the largest loan growth among other groups. Moreover, net profit 
and total assets of the banking sector
19 increased sharply during this period. Also, 
it is important to note that although private 4 banks were the banks that had 
extreme loan growth, their net profit growth was the smallest among the others. 
During this period, however, non performing loans increased by 157,6%. This 
indicates that in overall, while experiencing growth, Turkish banking sector had 
also incurred risks, but growth of nonperforming loans were relatively moderate 
when compared to the loan, asset and net profit growth rates. Also, we observe 
conservative growth rates in noninterest expenses and securities during 2003-
2010.  
  In 2003-2004 which is considered as a restructuring period for the Turkish 
banking sector following the 2001 crisis and in 2007-2008 periods which is the 
period hit by recent global financial crisis, we observe decrease in net profits of 
the banking sector. Also, it is important to note that soon after the 2007 crisis, 
total equity of the banking sector increased by 28,9% from 2007 to 2008. The 
idea was that increased equity could serve as a buffer against crisis.    
  As discussed in the previous section, in the literature, there is no consensus 
regarding inputs and outputs that should be used in the efficiency analysis of 
                                                            
18 Although the peer grouping used in this paper disregards foreign-owned banks as a sub category, we believe that it 
would not be inappropriate to use a peer grouping developed especially for ratio analysis in the study which is 
composed of several ratios regarding banks. Also, the empirical results for bank groups do not suggest irrelevancy 
given the expectations for the period under consideration. However, the appropriateness of the grouping is open to 
discussion for different input-output combinations, other than ratios. 
19 In this study, banking sector corresponds to 22 commercial banks. Therefore, total amounts regarding the banking 
sector were the totals of those 22 commercial banks that cover more than 90% of the total banking sector in terms of 
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banks. For the reasons explained previously, this study adopts mixed approach and 
uses 8 ratios (5 inputs and 3 outputs) to measure bank efficiency
20.  
The inputs used for each bank are: 
9 Securities / Total Assets   
9 Deposits / Total Assets   
9 Non Performing Loans (Gross) / Total (Cash) Loans
21 
9 Total Loans / Total Assets
22 
9 Non Interest Expense / Total (Average) Assets   
The outputs used are: 
9 Return on Average Assets (ROA): Net Profit (Loss) / Total (Average) Assets  
9 Return on Average Equity (ROE): Net Profit (Loss) / Total (Average) Equity  
9 Net Interest Income / Total Income 
  To further investigate the determinants of bank efficiency we follow the so 
called Two-Step approach, as suggested by Coelli et al. (1998). Using the 
efficiency measures derived from the DEA estimations as the dependent variable, 
we then estimate the following fixed effect regression model: 
 
* ˆ
k T   =b0  +b1ROA  +b2LNTA  +b3LOANSTA  +b4NPLTA(-1)    
+b5CAR  +b6DLNRGDP  +b7NIM  +b8INF  +b9LNDEP+ei 
         where: 
ROA: Return on average assets 
LNTA: Logarithm of total assets 
LOANSTA = Total Loans / Total Assets 
NPLTA(-1): Non Performing Loans (Gross) / Total (Cash) Loans with one period lag 
CAR: Capital adequacy ratio 
                                                            
20 Similar output and input combinations have been used in studies of Charnes (1990), Çolak and Altan (2002),    
      Cingi and Tarım (2000) and Aras and Kurt (2007). 
21 Since this ratio is considered to be bad (undesirable) output i.e. output that is tried to be minimized by banks, it is 
regarded as an input in this study. See Pasuphaty (2002) for more detailed discussion of the issue. 
22 Although in terms of intermediation and production approaches loans are regarded as output of a bank, the ratio of 
total loans to total assets are regarded as input in this study. The reason is that this ratio is regarded as an indicator of 
asset management and quality from the view point of the bank management. The concern of the bank management 
is not the production of loans, but careful placements of loans. So, when a bank extends its credits it would incur 
more risks and since bank wants to minimize the risk incurred, the ratio is classified as an input. Müge DİLER 98
DLNRGDP: Logarithm difference of real GDP
NIM: Net interest margin i.e. spread between deposit and loan rates 
INF: Inflation (% change in CPI, annually) 
LNDEP: Logarithm of total deposits 
5 5. Empricial Result  
  To obtain empirical results, output oriented DEA model under the assumption 
of VRS and output oriented MPI is used as formulated in methodology described 
in section 3. All the computational work is done by software package Frontier 
Efficiency Analysis with R (FEAR) 1.11 developed by Wilson (2008)
23. What 
distinguishes FEAR from the alternative software packages like DEAP or STATA is 
that it permits to estimate not only non parametric DEA estimates of technical, 
allocative, scale and overall efficiency (while assuming either CRS, NIRS or VRS) 
and MPIs but also it permits to estimate bootstrapped (i.e. bias corrected) 
efficiency scores which eventually enables us to do statistical inference based on 
those findings. In the first sub section of this part, bootstrapped efficiency scores 
of banks are discussed. The second sub section is devoted to the bootstrapped 
MPI scores of banks. The third sub section discusses the risk measurement issue. 
Finally, in the last sub section results of two-stage regression analysis are 
discussed.    
5.1. DEA Efficiency Scores of Banks 
  Based on the previously mentioned data, DEA efficiency scores are estimated 
for each bank, for the period 2003-2010. On this basis, as explained in the data 
section, banks are grouped into 5 as public, private 1, private 2, private 3 and 
private 4 banks according to their status and size, with private 4 being the bank 
group comprised of the smallest scale private banks. In the efficiency estimation a 
common frontier is assumed for all bank groups. Following the procedure 
described in Isik and Hassan (2002), the hypothesis of identical frontiers for each 
year under consideration is tested both by ANOVA (parametric) and Kruskal-Wallis 
(non parametric) tests. As a result, both test statistics given in the following table 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of identical frontier between groups. Therefore, 
                                                            
23 For further discussion on FEAR, see FEAR 1.11 Command Reference or User Guide, Wilson (2008) Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 99
bootstrapping technique is applied to the efficiency scores estimated from 
identical frontier assumption.    
Table 2: Summary of ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis Tests 
 
 
  Table 3 below summarizes the results and compares DEA efficiency scores with 
bootstrapped DEA efficiency scores of banks. 
 



























































(*)degrees of freedom is 4,17
2003 2003* 2004 2004* 2005 2005* 2006 2006* 2007 2007* 2008 2008* 2009 2009* 2010 2010*
T.C. Z7RAAT BANKASI A.b. 1,000 0,789 1,000 0,697 1,000 0,808 1,000 0,796 1,000 0,903 1,000 0,943 1,000 0,824 1,000 0,763
TÜRK7YE HALK BANKASI A.b. 1,000 0,732 1,000 0,708 0,657 0,587 0,792 0,719 0,871 0,827 0,971 0,946 1,000 0,849 1,000 0,768
PUBLIC 1,000 0,760 1,000 0,703 0,811 0,689 0,890 0,757 0,933 0,864 0,986 0,944 1,000 0,837 1,000 0,765
TÜRK7YE VAKIFLAR BANKASI T.A.O. 0,725 0,632 1,000 0,799 0,833 0,756 1,000 0,907 1,000 0,904 1,000 0,940 0,975 0,909 0,840 0,762
AKBANK T.A.b. 1,000 0,644 1,000 0,707 1,000 0,806 1,000 0,858 1,000 0,930 1,000 0,939 1,000 0,912 1,000 0,772
TÜRK7YE GARANT7 BANKASI A.b. 1,000 0,646 0,744 0,676 0,853 0,791 0,860 0,791 1,000 0,899 1,000 0,942 1,000 0,894 1,000 0,839
TÜRK7YE 7b BANKASI A.b. 0,478 0,414 0,739 0,672 0,898 0,817 0,834 0,776 0,744 0,704 0,790 0,769 0,859 0,806 0,876 0,808
YAPI VE KRED7 BANKASI A.b. 0,280 0,238 0,443 0,405 0,677 0,639 0,759 0,699 0,686 0,661 0,953 0,926 0,870 0,820 1,000 0,886
PRIVATE 1 0,627 0,482 0,754 0,636 0,845 0,759 0,885 0,803 0,874 0,812 0,945 0,900 0,939 0,867 0,940 0,812
TÜRK EKONOM7 BANKASI A.b. 1,000 0,631 1,000 0,711 0,955 0,858 1,000 0,839 0,894 0,850 1,000 0,941 0,770 0,715 0,907 0,821
FORT7S BANK A.b. 1,000 0,636 0,662 0,587 0,809 0,749 0,952 0,880 0,900 0,865 0,901 0,876 0,685 0,642 0,765 0,717
ING BANK A.b. 0,847 0,711 1,000 0,752 1,000 0,811 0,974 0,894 0,899 0,854 0,745 0,724 1,000 0,823 1,000 0,852
F7NANSBANK A.b. 0,901 0,764 1,000 0,748 1,000 0,797 1,000 0,803 1,000 0,928 0,901 0,878 0,876 0,817 1,000 0,893
HSBC BANK A.b. 1,000 0,650 1,000 0,706 1,000 0,803 1,000 0,797 1,000 0,900 1,000 0,939 1,000 0,904 1,000 0,908
DEN7ZBANK A.b. 0,775 0,666 0,901 0,803 0,938 0,841 0,998 0,909 0,862 0,826 1,000 0,940 1,000 0,819 1,000 0,852
PRIVATE 2 0,916 0,675 0,917 0,714 0,948 0,809 0,987 0,853 0,924 0,870 0,920 0,879 0,879 0,782 0,941 0,838
bEKERBANK T.A.b. 1,000 0,745 1,000 0,862 0,950 0,877 0,747 0,692 0,904 0,869 0,964 0,940 0,884 0,832 0,804 0,747
CITIBANK A.b. 1,000 0,836 0,787 0,717 1,000 0,805 1,000 0,828 1,000 0,897 1,000 0,957 0,800 0,748 1,000 0,767
TEKST7L BANKASI A.b. 1,000 0,637 1,000 0,700 0,757 0,684 1,000 0,812 1,000 0,901 1,000 0,939 1,000 0,898 0,913 0,836
ALTERNAT7FBANK A.b. 0,549 0,486 0,374 0,335 0,782 0,709 1,000 0,795 1,000 0,899 1,000 0,940 1,000 0,920 0,691 0,631
ANADOLUBANK A.b. 1,000 0,619 1,000 0,703 0,749 0,669 0,840 0,763 1,000 0,896 1,000 0,940 1,000 0,822 1,000 0,748
PRIVATE 3 0,887 0,654 0,783 0,633 0,841 0,745 0,911 0,776 0,980 0,892 0,993 0,943 0,933 0,842 0,873 0,743
ARAP TÜRK BANKASI A.b. 1,000 0,628 1,000 0,714 1,000 0,812 1,000 0,803 1,000 0,897 1,000 0,941 1,000 0,820 1,000 0,759
TURKISH BANK A.b. 1,000 0,652 1,000 0,701 1,000 0,800 1,000 0,801 1,000 0,901 1,000 0,941 1,000 0,816 1,000 0,759
TURKLAND BANK A.b. 0,767 0,662 0,714 0,640 0,747 0,691 0,422 0,394 0,840 0,814 1,000 0,940 0,907 0,847 0,616 0,577
EUROBANK TEKFEN A.b. 0,700 0,601 0,731 0,658 0,633 0,582 0,702 0,648 1,000 0,900 1,000 0,940 0,401 0,371 0,347 0,315
PRIVATE 4 0,856 0,635 0,850 0,678 0,829 0,715 0,738 0,636 0,957 0,877 1,000 0,941 0,776 0,677 0,680 0,569
BANKING SECTOR 0,831 0,620 0,841 0,669 0,865 0,754 0,888 0,772 0,932 0,862 0,962 0,915 0,895 0,798 0,877 0,748
(*) Bootstrapped DEA efficicency scores.Müge DİLER 100
    The banks with an efficiency score of 1,000 are regarded as efficient banks 
whereas banks with efficiency scores below 1 are regarded as inefficient by an 
amount below 1. The group efficiency scores equals to geometric means of 
efficiency scores of banks within that group.  
  Comparison of DEA efficiency scores with bootstrapped efficiency scores show 
that banks which are indicated as inefficient by the ordinary DEA procedure are 
actually more inefficient than it is thought to be due to the bias inherent in 
ordinary DEA scores. So, DEA efficiency scores tend to overestimate the actual 
efficiency of banks. 
  During the period under study, bootstrapped efficiency scores vary between 
0,5 and 0,9 for the bank groups and 0,6 and 0,9 for the banking sector. The 
following Figure-1 together with the Table-3 above allows us to follow the trend in 
bank groups during 2003-2010. 
  As it is seen from the Figure 1, in terms of the evaluation of DEA scores, 
performance of Turkish banks could be studied by dividing the time period under 
consideration into two: 2003-2008 period (upward trend) and 2008-2010 period 
(downward trend). In the 2003-2008 period, Turkish banking sector efficiency 
score has improved from 0,62 to 0,92, but decreased to 0,75 thereafter.  
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    It is observed that during 2003-2008, efficiency scores of bank groups had 
increased gradually and uninterruptedly, except public and private 4 banks
24. In 
contrast to the other banking groups, public banks had suffered during 2003-
2005 period, but caught the increasing trend thereafter. It is examined that 
decline in Halk Bank’s ROA and ROE ratios is responsible for the downward trend 
in 2003-2005 period in public banks. As it could be seen in the figure above, 
another exception to the general upward trend is the decline in efficiency scores 
of private 4 banks from 2005 to 2006. Within the group, the poorest performance 
belongs to the Turkland bank which obtained net loss and thus negative ROA and 
ROE ratios in 2005-2006. Moreover, it is the only bank obtaining net loss in this 
period among all other banks in the sector. 
  After the year 2008, however, all bank groups experienced declines in their 
efficiency scores as suggested by Figure-1. The main reason of the decline during 
2008-2010 period is the global financial crisis which was initiated by the USA 
economy in September 2007 and which extended through the most of European 
economies thereafter. According to the results, impacts of global financial crisis 
began to be experienced by the Turkish banking sector 2008 onwards. The 
sharpest decline was observed in private 4 banks (0,3 units). Other sharp declines 
were experienced by public and private 3 banks, respectively. It is known that in 
crisis periods, depending on the reduced GDP growth which is accompanied by 
lower household incomes, the probability of credits to default increases. So, by 
increasing loans especially in those periods, banks would obviously incur more 
risks than normal times. So, keeping pre-crisis loan growth rates in crisis periods 
would be riskier for banks and decrease efficiency. Our finding is supported by the 
fact that from 2008 to 2009, the largest loan growth rates are observed in private 
4 (23,4%), public (22,3%) and private 3 banks (10,1%) (see Appendix A.1), 
meanwhile, according to the Figure-1, the banks that suffer most in terms of 
efficiency are private 4, public and private 3 banks, respectively. Also it is 
important to note that not only largest loan growth rates but also the largest 
rates in nonperforming loans are also observed by private 4 banks (99%) in this 
period (see Appendix A.1). On the contrary, private 1 and private 2 banks 
decreased both their loan growth rates and loan shares in the market in crisis 
                                                            
24 Also, private 3 banks encountered decline in their efficiency scores from 2003 to 2004, however the decline is 
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period (see Appendix A.1), so they experienced relatively smoother and milder 
decline in their efficiency scores. 
  Private 2 banks is an exception to 2008-2010 period. In contrast to other bank 
groups, private 2 banks improved their efficiency from 2009 to 2010. The reason 
of this performance could be attributed to the relatively conservative approach of 
private 2 banks. That’s to say, while other bank groups, especially private 4 banks, 
continue to grow in the market by increasing their deposits and loans further, 
private 2 banks seems to decrease their deposit and loan growth rates (see 
Appendix A.1.). Those decreases in deposit and loan growth rates were 
accompanied by sharp declines in NPLRs which finally brought improvement in 
efficiency scores. So, it could be concluded that, in the crisis environment, 
decreased deposit and loan growth rates could serve as a buffer against crisis. 
  An advantage of bootstrapping is that it predicts the efficiency scores within a 
confidence interval which enables us to do statistical inferences. More specifically, 
bootstrapping allows assessing whether the efficiency scores obtained are 
statistically significant. If it is significant, then the results explained above show 
real efficiency level of the banks, otherwise it should be considered as nothing 
more than a trick of sampling noise. Hence, if the efficiency score obtained by 
DEA falls into the confidence interval, then one can infer that efficiency score is 
statistically significant and efficiency score could be used in statistical analysis. On 
this basis, Figure-2 below shows confidence interval widths for bias corrected 
(bootstrapped) efficiency scores of bank groups
25. According to the figures, all 









   
                                                            
25 Upper and lower bounds of confidence intervals and bias corrected efficiency scores for bank groups are obtained 
through calculating geometric means of confidence intervals and efficiency scores of banks for each group. Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 103






P U B L I C P R I V A T E  1P R I V A T E  2P R I V A T E  3P R I V A T E  4
ub 0,992 0,622 0,908 0,879 0,849
lb 0,709 0,440 0,614 0,612 0,582









P U B L I C P R I V A T E  1P R I V A T E  2P R I V A T E  3P R I V A T E  4
ub 0,994 0,749 0,912 0,778 0,845
lb 0,619 0,584 0,638 0,579 0,603









PUBLIC PRIVATE 1 PRIVATE 2 PRIVATE 3 PRIVATE 4
ub 0,806 0,840 0,942 0,836 0,824
lb 0,622 0,714 0,745 0,688 0,661









PUBLIC PRIVATE 1 PRIVATE 2 PRIVATE 3 PRIVATE 4
ub 0,885 0,881 0,982 0,906 0,734
lb 0,645 0,749 0,744 0,666 0,552









P U B L I C P R I V A T E  1P R I V A T E  2P R I V A T E  3P R I V A T E  4
ub 0,931 0,872 0,922 0,977 0,954
lb 0,770 0,737 0,808 0,783 0,774









P U B L I C P R I V A T E  1P R I V A T E  2P R I V A T E  3P R I V A T E  4
ub 0,984 0,943 0,918 0,992 0,999
lb 0,854 0,805 0,795 0,840 0,805









PUBLIC PRIVATE 1 PRIVATE 2 PRIVATE 3 PRIVATE 4
ub 0,995 0,935 0,876 0,929 0,773
lb 0,676 0,813 0,682 0,753 0,566









P U B L I C P R I V A T E  1P R I V A T E  2P R I V A T E  3P R I V A T E  4
ub 0,994 0,935 0,935 0,868 0,676
lb 0,610 0,726 0,777 0,653 0,489









Figure 2: Confidence Intervals for Bias Corrected Efficiency Scores
26
                                                            
26 In the following figures, ub stands for upper bound of the confidence interval whereas lb stands for  
    lower bound and deabc denotes the bias corrected (bootstrapped) DEA efficiency score.  Müge DİLER 104
First figure suggests that, efficiency scores of all bank groups are within 
confidence interval and vary between 0,6 and 0,8 range, except private 1 banks 
which should be considered as significantly more inefficient than other bank 
groups in 2003. In other words, efficiency differences between private 1 banks 
and other bank groups are significant in a statistical sense in 2003. The most 
efficient bank group in this period was public banks.  
However, by the year 2005 banks efficiency scores began to converge each 
other and come closer to the fully efficient level of 1,00. From 2003 to 2005, 
efficiency of all private bank groups improved whereas efficiency of public banks 
deteriorated. In contrast to the 2003, the most efficient bank group became 
private 2 and private 1 banks, respectively and the least efficient bank group 
became public banks. 
In 2006, all bank groups’ efficiency scores increased compared to the 2005. 
Performances of Turkish banks continued to increase until 2008 and reached top 
levels in the year 2008. Also it is important to note that confidence intervals 
became narrower compared to the previous years in this period. This means 
increase in accuracy of our estimation and assessments based on those 
estimations. In this period, bank efficiency scores vary between 0,8 and 1,0. Public 
banks and private 3 banks became the most efficient banks in 2008. 
However, in 2009, we observe decreases in bank efficiency scores due to the 
impacts of global financial crisis occurred in September, 2007. Banks began to 
diverge from each other in terms of efficiency. Moreover, efficiency range fell to 
0,6 - 1,00 interval. The largest decrease in efficiency was observed in private 4 
banks. Based on the confidence intervals, figure suggests that in this period, 
performance of private 4 banks are significantly lower than other bank groups. In 
2010, private 4 banks deteriorated further. All bank groups efficiency scores 
decreased, except private 2 banks in this period.  
5 5.2. Malmquist Productivity Index of Banks 
The output oriented bootstrapped Malmquist productivity index (MPI) with its 
components is estimated for all bank groups in the sample over the period 2003-
2010 through 2000 random resamplings. Bank by bank results are displayed in 
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Table-4 below summarizes MPI scores
27 (malm) and its components, namely 
technical change (tech), efficiency change (eff) which is further decomposed as 
pure efficiency change (pure.eff) and scale efficiency change (scale) for bank 
groups and the following Figure-3 shows the cumulative MPI scores
28 obtained for 
each group of bank and allows us to assess the productivity changes over 2003-
2010. It is important to note that Table-4 shows one period change in productivity 
from time t to t+1 whereas Figure-3 shows the cumulative change in the 
productivity over the period under consideration. As noted earlier, a value greater 
than unity indicates improvement in that component whereas a value less than 
unity indicates deterioration.   
On this basis, as table and figure suggest, during 2003-2010, we observe 
significant deteriorations in MPI scores from 2007 to 2008. This fact is supported 
by the global financial crisis initiated on September, 2007. From 2008 to 2009, 
however, we observe improvements. 2009 improvements are followed by small 
scale and ignorable deteriorations in MPI scores in 2010. 
According to Table-4, from 2003 to 2004, bank groups that experienced 
improvements in their productivity, i.e. bank groups that have MPI greater than 
unity are private 1 and public banks
29. Private 1 banks’ improvement could largely 
be attributed to the efficiency change whereas technical change is responsible for 
the improvement in productivity of public banks. In other words, from 2003 to 
2004 private 1 banks came closer to the best practice frontier by benefiting both 
from pure (1.202) and scale efficiency (1.167) changes while public banks 
managed to shift their production frontier further away. In banking literature, this 
implies that in this period, private 1 banks managed to use their existing funding 
sources (inputs) in more profitable instruments (outputs), as a result of correct 
managerial policies and economies of scale, on the other hand public banks 
expand their intermediation activities further. Especially, restructuring reforms 
implemented soon after the 2001 crisis in Turkey to remove the inefficiencies 
inherent to public banks were responsible for the high performance of public 
banks in this period. In overall, sector’s productivity has increased in this period.  
                                                            
27 MPI score for each group of bank is obtained by calculating geometric mean of MPI scores of banks within that 
group.  
28 In the calculation of cumulative MPI, for each group of bank, MPI in 2003 is assumed to be 1,00 and the MPI in 
2004  is estimated by multiplying 1,00 with MPI score for that group in 2004 and MPI in 2005 is estimated by 
multiplying MPI score of 2004 obtained in the previous step with that of 2005 and so on.  
29 Private 3 bank groups’ productivity improvement is negligible, namely it’s 1,001.Müge DİLER 106
T Table 4: MPI and Its Components for Bank Groups, 2003-2010 
 
MPI (2003-2004) malm eff tech pure.eff scale
PUBLIC 1.121 0.950 1.180 1.000 0.950
PRIVATE 1 1.435 1.404 1.022 1.202 1.167
PRIVATE 2 0.956 1.013 0.944 1.002 1.011
PRIVATE 3 1.001 0.910 1.100 0.883 1.031
PRIVATE 4 0.874 1.002 0.873 0.993 1.009
SECTOR 1.058 1.056 1.001 1.013 1.043
MPI (2004-2005) malm eff tech pure.eff scale
PUBLIC 0.970 0.861 1.127 0.811 1.062
PRIVATE 1 1.107 0.999 1.108 1.121 0.891
PRIVATE 2 1.340 0.996 1.346 1.033 0.964
PRIVATE 3 1.124 1.002 1.121 1.075 0.933
PRIVATE 4 0.986 0.911 1.082 0.976 0.934
SECTOR 1.132 0.969 1.168 1.028 0.943
MPI (2005-2006) malm eff tech pure.eff scale
PUBLIC 1.101 1.099 1.002 1.098 1.002
PRIVATE 1 1.054 1.167 0.903 1.047 1.114
PRIVATE 2 0.988 1.053 0.938 1.042 1.010
PRIVATE 3 1.022 1.098 0.931 1.083 1.014
PRIVATE 4 0.743 0.927 0.801 0.889 1.043
SECTOR 0.969 1.067 0.907 1.027 1.039
MPI (2006-2007) malm eff tech pure.eff scale
PUBLIC 1.126 1.047 1.075 1.049 0.998
PRIVATE 1 1.052 0.980 1.074 0.987 0.993
PRIVATE 2 0.812 0.927 0.875 0.936 0.991
PRIVATE 3 1.170 1.152 1.015 1.076 1.071
PRIVATE 4 1.181 1.259 0.938 1.298 0.970
SECTOR 1.032 1.055 0.979 1.049 1.006
MPI (2007-2008) malm eff tech pure.eff scale
PUBLIC 0.789 1.058 0.745 1.056 1.002
PRIVATE 1 0.804 1.101 0.730 1.081 1.018
PRIVATE 2 0.793 1.020 0.777 0.995 1.025
PRIVATE 3 0.694 0.993 0.699 1.013 0.980
PRIVATE 4 0.961 1.006 0.956 1.045 0.963
SECTOR 0.799 1.032 0.774 1.033 1.000
MPI (2008-2009) malm eff tech pure.eff scale
PUBLIC 1.384 1.015 1.364 1.015 1.001
PRIVATE 1 1.261 0.997 1.265 0.994 1.003
PRIVATE 2 0.996 0.943 1.057 0.956 0.986
PRIVATE 3 0.981 0.941 1.042 0.940 1.001
PRIVATE 4 1.206 0.883 1.366 0.776 1.138
SECTOR 1.117 0.949 1.177 0.930 1.021
MPI (2009-2010) malm eff tech pure.eff scale
PUBLIC 0.963 1.000 0.963 1.000 1.000
PRIVATE 1 1.024 1.005 1.020 1.002 1.003
PRIVATE 2 1.019 1.024 0.995 1.070 0.957
PRIVATE 3 0.986 0.915 1.077 0.935 0.978
PRIVATE 4 0.872 0.840 1.038 0.876 0.959
SECTOR 0.979 0.957 1.024 0.980 0.976Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 107
F Figure 3: Cumulative MPI Scores, 2003-2010 
From 2004 to 2005, except private 4 banks, all private bank groups 
experienced improvements in their productivity which is attributed to the technical 
change rather than efficiency change. This finding is supported by the fact that 
following the 2001 Turkish banking crisis which had long lasting effects on banks 
up to 2003, intermediation activities had gained pace once again. After then, 
private banks began to expand their intermediation activities and hence improved 
their performances based on the restored financial stability. However, it is 
observed that in this period, although pure efficiency change component of 
private banks improved, they suffered from deterioration in their efficiency change 
due to worsening in scale efficiency component. This implies that by expanding 
their intermediation activities those banks have reached decreasing returns to 
scale portion of their long run average cost curve. This means that there is no 
room left for those banks to benefit from economies of scale by expanding 
production further.   
In 2005-2006 period, banking sector encountered negligible decrease in 
productivity which stem from the sharp deterioration in productivity of private 4 
banks as suggested by the figure. Although both efficiency and technical change 
scores of private 4 banks was below unity in this period, the reason of worsening 
in productivity could largely be attributed to the deterioration in technical change. 
Furthermore, in this period, loan, deposit and asset shares of private 4 banks in 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
PUBLIC 1.000 1.121 1.087 1.197 1.347 1.062 1.471 1.417
PRIVATE 1 1.000 1.435 1.588 1.673 1.761 1.415 1.784 1.827
PRIVATE 2 1.000 0.956 1.281 1.265 1.027 0.814 0.811 0.827
PRIVATE 3 1.000 1.001 1.125 1.150 1.346 0.934 0.916 0.903
PRIVATE 4 1.000 0.874 0.862 0.641 0.757 0.727 0.877 0.765
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the market decreased whereas shares of other private bank groups increased. So, 
it could be argued that other private bank groups expanded at the expense of the 
private 4 banks in this period. On the contrary, from 2006 to 2007, we observe 
deterioration only in the productivity of private 2 banks. However, both private 4 
and private 2 banks productivity scores were below the sector’s average, but in 
overall sector’s productivity improved. 
In contrast to the previous years, from 2007 to 2008, depending on the global 
financial crisis, we observe sharp deteriorations in productivity of all bank groups 
as suggested by the Figure-3. According to the Table-4, the reason of decline is 
the worsening in technical change rather than efficiency change. This implies large 
contractions in best practice frontiers of banking groups. In banking terms, this 
means reduction in intermediation activities of banks due to the uncertainty and 
financial instability created by the global financial crisis. On the other hand, we 
observe that efficiency change component is above unity in this period. The 
reason is that since best practice frontier contracted, banks are getting closer to 
the frontier.   
Soon after the crisis, from 2008 to 2009, we observe improvements in sector-
wide, with negligible deteriorations in productivity of private 2 and private 3 
banks. The reason of improvements is the advance in technical change. So, by 
considering the reason of worsening in the previous period, it could be argued 
that technical change rather than efficiency change is more responsive to financial 
crisis. Moreover, in this period, except public banks, all bank groups suffered from 
deterioration in their pure efficiency change scores as suggested by Table-4. This 
reflects poor managerial policy actions taken soon after the crisis. Also, base year 
effect seems to dominate in this period and banks’ productivity scores have 
improved in 2009 compared to 2008 which is the year hit most severely by the 
crisis. According to the figure, private 1 and public banks’ productivity scores are 
above the sector average whereas other bank groups’ performances are below 
the sector in 2009. 
Finally, from 2009 to 2010, we observe that the base year effect had 
eliminated and banks began experience small decreases in their productivity in 
2010 compared to 2009. According to Table-4, private 1 and private 2 bank 
groups are the only ones experiencing productivity improvement in this period. Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 109
Although all components of MPI is above 1 for private 1 banks, the main reason 
of improvement is the technical change. However, the reason of improvement for 
private 2 banks is the efficiency change which stems from pure efficiency change. 
Overall, sector’s productivity suffered from deterioration in efficiency change (both 
pure and scale efficiency changes) component from 2009 to 2010. Poor 
managerial decision strategies together with contractionary policies could be 
responsible for this outcome. 
Another finding is that, as suggested by Figure-3, from 2003 to 2007 public, 
private 2 and private 3 banks converge to each other in terms of productivity 
whereas private 1 and private 4 banks diverge from the rest. That’s to say, 
productivity of private 1 banks are seem to outperform the rest whereas 
productivity of private 4 banks fall behind. However, private banks began to 
diverge from each other by the year 2007. The reason may be the differentiation 
in banking products among bank groups. Introduction of new products i.e. 
derivatives, advantageous and competitive consumer credits could help that bank 
group to perform better. Finally, in 2010, it is observed that private 1 and public 
banks diverge from the rest and surpass other bank groups and private bank 
groups converge to each other once again in terms of cumulative MPI calculated 
over 2003-2010. 
Similar to the bootstrapped efficiency scores, bootstrapped MPIs are also 
predicted within a confidence interval which allows us to do statistical inferences 
based on those estimates. Figure-4 below depicts the confidence interval widths 
for bias corrected (bootstrapped) MPIs of bank groups. As seen from the figure, 
the rigidity of estimated confidence intervals shows the accuracy of the 
estimation. 
According to the figure, from 2003 to 2004, public and private 1 banks 
encountered improvements whereas other bank groups encountered deterioration 
in their productivity scores. Bootstrapping enables us to conclude that those bank 
groups’ productivity scores were also significantly different from public and private 
1 banks in a statistical sense. 
From 2004 to 2005, the only bank groups that we observe deterioration in 
their productivity scores are the public and private 4 banks. However, the 
deterioration is ignorable. Moreover, bank groups’ productivity scores began to Müge DİLER 110
converge each other, with private 2 banks being an exception due to its high 
productivity score. From 2005 to 2006, the convergence trend among bank 
groups in terms of productivity became more apparent. The only exception to the 
trend in this period is the private 4 banks whose productivity score is significantly 
lower than the rest.    
During 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 periods, trend toward convergence was 
broken down and due to the impacts of global financial crisis on the banking 
sector; we observe divergence among bank productivity scores. More specifically, 
from 2007 to 2008, all bank groups experienced deterioration in their productivity 
scores as seen from the Figure-4. 
Soon after the crisis, from 2009 to 2010, similar to what we observe in bank 
efficiency scores, a gradual recovery of banking sector is detected. Public and 
private 4 banks are the only bank groups that experienced deterioration in their 
productivity scores. Moreover, convergence trend observed in the pre crisis period 
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30 In the following figures, ub stands for upper bound of the confidence interval whereas lb stands for lower bound 
and MPI(bc) stands for the bias corrected (bootstrapped) MPIs. 
P U B L I C P R I V A T E  1P R I V A T E  2P R I V A T E  3P R I V A T E  4
ub 1.275 1.698 1.095 1.150 0.955
lb 0.939 1.290 0.779 0.855 0.741












P U B L I C P R I V A T E  1P R I V A T E  2P R I V A T E  3P R I V A T E  4
ub 1.107 1.213 1.481 1.293 1.097
lb 0.918 1.022 1.187 0.942 0.909











P U B L I C P R I V A T E  1P R I V A T E  2P R I V A T E  3P R I V A T E  4
ub 1.190 1.167 1.080 1.132 0.795
lb 1.019 0.978 0.821 0.853 0.683










P U B L I C P R I V A T E  1P R I V A T E  2P R I V A T E  3P R I V A T E  4
ub 1.173 1.109 0.889 1.279 1.270
lb 1.060 0.963 0.758 1.025 1.088










PUBLIC PRIVATE 1 PRIVATE 2 PRIVATE 3 PRIVATE 4
ub 0.820 0.849 0.843 0.761 1.007
lb 0.772 0.767 0.741 0.646 0.876









PUBLIC PRIVATE 1 PRIVATE 2 PRIVATE 3 PRIVATE 4
ub 1.406 1.375 1.068 1.058 1.314
lb 1.311 1.200 0.910 0.909 1.084











PUBLIC PRIVATE 1 PRIVATE 2 PRIVATE 3 PRIVATE 4
ub 1.001 1.091 1.098 1.046 0.933
lb 0.820 0.919 0.911 0.909 0.805









5 5.3. Risk Measurement 
  The main shortcoming of efficiency measurement models is that although they 
are able to show the extent to which the banks are successful in transforming the 
inputs into outputs, i.e. both bad and good loans, they are not equipped to take 
into account risk factors. In other words, they assume that banks are risk neutral. 
However, by expanding loans and collecting deposits banks do not only increase 
their output and efficiency but also incur risks in the financial markets while 
carrying out intermediation activities.  
  Another limitation regarding efficiency measurement models is that book 
values of net loans are assumed to be equal to the market values of gross loans. 
So, while assessing efficiency, the amount of banks’ nonperforming loans should 
also be taken into consideration. Based on those shortcomings, it could be argued 
that the most efficient banks indicated by efficiency measurement models are not 
necessarily the least risky banks. This paper, however, improves upon the DEA 
literature by introducing risk taking measure for each bank. Based on Laeven’s 
(1997) and Aras and Kurt’s (2007) papers, a risk taking measure is defined and 
calculated for each bank during 2003-2010, in separation of pre-crisis (2003-2007) 
and post-crisis periods (2007-2010).   
  Since the technical bank efficiency measure cannot distinguish between 
excessive risk taking and increased bank performance, the risk taking measure is 
developed on the basis of excessive loan growth.  If the loans provided by a bank 
in a certain period exceed the quantity of loan which can be provided by the bank 
using efficiently the inputs in the same period, the difference is called excessive 
loan growth (Aras and Kurt, 2007).  
  Based on this definition, let y1
f,t be the amount of loans provided by bank f in 
base year t and y1
f,(t+T) be the amount of loans provided by bank f in year t+T and 
șy
f,t be the inverse of the output oriented efficiency measure of bank f in year t 
estimated in section 5.1. Therefore, the efficient level of loans for bank f in year t 
given its inputs in year t would be șy
f,t * y1
f,t and similarly, the efficient level of 
loans for bank f in year t+T given its inputs in year t+T would be șy
f,(t+T) * y1
f,(t+T). 
However, with T small, there is no a priori reason to assume a major change in 
efficiency, hence in șy
f from year t to t+T. Therefore, the efficient level of loans in 
year t+T is expected to be equal to    Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 113




instead of actual level y1
f,(t+T). So, the amount of excessive loans would be defined 
as,  
(5.3.2.)     y1




Based on this definition, excessive loan growth would be equal to                           






Equivalently, excessive loan growth could be re defined as,  
(5.3.4.)     (y1
f,(t+T) / y1
f,t) * [1- (șy
f,(t+T) / șy
f,t)] 
Therefore, based on the assumption that t is the base year i.e. benchmark and 
that the efficiency remains constant during the period under consideration, the 
risk taking measure from year t to t+T is defined as, 








f,(t+T) and  y1
f,t are the loan levels of bank f in year t and t+T, and șy
f,(t+T) 
and șy
f,t are the inverses of the output oriented, bootstrapped DEA bank efficiency 
measures for the years t and t+T calculated in section 5.1. 
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T Table 5: Risk Taking Measures of Banks, 2003-2010
  The risk taking measure greater (smaller) than zero indicates that loan growth 
rate is multiplied by the increased (decreased) bank efficiency scores from time t 
to t+T. In other words, our risk taking measure is positively related with output 
oriented bootstrapped DEA efficiency scores and negatively related with șy
f 
(inverse of output oriented bootstrapped DEA efficiency score), by definition.    
  It is important to note that as suggested by Laeven (1997) the risk measure 
defined in equation 5.3.5. is a function of the change in bank efficiency. 
Therefore, any relationship found between the change in efficiency and the risk 
taking measure would be an artifact of our definition. However, this problem does 
not arise when we relate risk taking to the initial level of efficiency in the base 
year t only (see eqn. 5.3.1.). Moreover, in the assessment of risk level of banks, 
risk taking measure is evaluated together with the changes in bank’s 
nonperforming loan ratio in order to avoid flawed interpretations regarding bank 
riskiness.   
  As it can be seen in Table-5 initially, risk measure is calculated for the entire 
time period under the analysis. We then divide the entire time period into two as 
pre and post crisis periods to see whether there is a structural change in risk 
profile of Turkish banks before and after the crisis. To evaluate pre crisis period, 
the year 2003 is taken as benchmark and to evaluate post crisis period the year 
2007 is taken as benchmark. In overall terms, the results indicate that from 2003 
R NPLR NPLR Change in  Credit R NPLR NPLR Change in  Credit R NPLR NPLR Change in  Credit
Bank 2003-2010 2003 2010 NPLR Growth 2003-2007 2003 2007 NPLR Growth 2007-2010 2007 2010 NPLR Growth
T.C. Z7RAAT BANKASI A.b. -0,40 32,70 1,50 -31,20 10,44 0,54 32,70 1,83 -30,87 3,27 -0,49 1,83 1,50 -0,33 1,68
TÜRK7YE HALK BANKASI A.b. 0,81 31,63 3,88 -27,75 16,50 0,82 31,63 5,49 -26,14 6,15 -0,19 5,49 3,88 -1,61 1,45
PUBLIC 0,21 32,17 2,69 -29,48 12,48 0,68 32,17 3,66 -28,51 4,24 -0,34 3,66 2,69 -0,97 1,57
TÜRK7YE VAKIFLAR BANKASI T.A.O. 1,61 14,03 4,85 -9,18 8,44 1,47 14,03 4,72 -9,31 3,90 -0,36 4,72 4,85 0,13 0,93
AKBANK T.A.b. 1,03 1,29 2,39 1,10 5,16 1,31 1,29 2,71 1,42 3,27 -0,30 2,71 2,39 -0,32 0,45
TÜRK7YE GARANT7 BANKASI A.b. 2,25 4,46 2,96 -1,50 8,80 1,57 4,46 2,28 -2,18 4,60 -0,13 2,28 2,96 0,68 0,75
TÜRK7YE 7b BANKASI A.b. 3,57 11,89 3,70 -8,19 6,33 1,58 11,89 4,35 -7,54 2,85 0,25 4,35 3,70 -0,65 0,91
YAPI VE KRED7 BANKASI A.b. 4,76 8,45 3,54 -4,91 5,50 2,28 8,45 5,89 -2,56 2,56 0,46 5,89 3,54 -2,35 0,83
PRIVATE 1 2,64 8,02 3,49 -4,54 6,60 1,64 8,02 3,99 -4,03 3,34 -0,01 3,99 3,49 -0,50 0,75
TÜRK EKONOM7 BANKASI A.b. 2,34 2,12 3,06 0,94 9,12 1,53 2,12 1,78 -0,34 4,95 -0,06 1,78 3,06 1,28 0,70
FORT7S BANK A.b. 0,45 3,69 4,74 1,05 2,98 0,72 3,69 4,29 0,60 1,72 -0,30 4,29 4,74 0,45 0,46
ING BANK A.b. 0,91 1,01 3,18 2,17 4,49 0,65 1,01 1,31 0,30 2,86 0,00 1,31 3,18 1,87 0,42
F7NANSBANK A.b. 1,37 3,37 6,62 3,25 8,42 0,94 3,37 2,77 -0,60 4,32 -0,07 2,77 6,62 3,85 0,77
HSBC BANK A.b. 1,47 1,97 8,94 6,97 4,19 1,41 1,97 3,23 1,26 4,07 0,01 3,23 8,94 5,71 0,02
DEN7ZBANK A.b. 2,59 5,85 4,92 -0,93 10,89 1,31 5,85 2,38 -3,47 5,77 0,05 2,38 4,92 2,54 0,76
PRIVATE 2 1,52 3,00 5,24 2,24 6,42 1,09 3,00 2,63 -0,38 3,79 -0,06 2,63 5,24 2,62 0,55
bEKERBANK T.A.b. 0,03 11,71 6,01 -5,70 9,42 0,73 11,71 4,00 -7,71 4,10 -0,34 4,00 6,01 2,01 1,04
CITIBANK A.b. -0,36 6,17 12,28 6,11 3,02 0,22 6,17 5,72 -0,45 2,33 -0,21 5,72 12,28 6,56 0,21
TEKST7L BANKASI A.b. 0,84 0,34 4,94 4,60 2,54 1,16 0,34 1,41 1,07 2,97 -0,07 1,41 4,94 3,53 -0,11
ALTERNAT7FBANK A.b. 1,90 11,06 4,63 -6,43 7,26 2,25 11,06 3,47 -7,59 3,90 -0,72 3,47 4,63 1,16 0,69
ANADOLUBANK A.b. 1,01 1,92 2,89 0,97 4,84 1,07 1,92 1,63 -0,29 2,47 -0,33 1,63 2,89 1,26 0,68
PRIVATE 3 0,68 6,24 6,15 -0,09 5,54 1,09 6,24 3,25 -2,99 3,16 -0,33 3,25 6,15 2,90 0,57
ARAP TÜRK BANKASI A.b. 1,63 22,72 1,57 -21,15 8,45 0,93 22,72 4,70 -18,02 2,10 -0,55 4,70 1,57 -3,13 2,04
TURKISH BANK A.b. 4,02 5,49 4,29 -1,20 27,61 2,51 5,49 0,93 -4,56 8,10 -0,59 0,93 4,29 3,36 2,14
TURKLAND BANK A.b. -1,29 7,13 3,99 -3,14 7,77 0,71 7,13 2,15 -4,98 2,77 -0,96 2,15 3,99 1,84 1,33
EUROBANK TEKFEN A.b. -9,36 4,34 6,67 2,33 9,34 1,81 4,34 3,82 -0,52 4,46 -3,51 3,82 6,67 2,85 0,89
PRIVATE 4 -1,25 9,92 4,13 -5,79 9,50 1,49 9,92 2,90 -7,02 3,76 -1,40 2,90 4,13 1,23 1,21
SECTOR 0,76 11,87 4,34 -7,53 7,28 1,20 11,87 3,28 -8,59 3,53 -0,43 3,28 4,34 1,06 0,83
R (2003-2010) Overall R (2003-2007) Pre-Crisis Period R (2007-2010) Post-Crisis PeriodEfficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 115
to 2010, the only bank group experiencing decline in riskiness is private 4 banks. 
Meanwhile, on the average they encountered 9,5% credit growth, together with 
5,8 points decline in their NPLR. This implies that during 2003-2010, private 4 
banks expanded their loans, at the same time, they managed to decrease 
nonperforming loans and so the risk. Investing into relatively secure loans may be 
the reason of this outcome.  
  On the other hand, public banks and private 3 banks incur moderate risks while 
private 1 and private 2 banks become the banks with the highest risk taking 
measure, respectively in this period. When combined with our previous findings, 
we observe that from 2003 to 2010 efficiency of private 2 banks increased from 
0,675 to 0,838, however risk taking measure is positive and NPLR increased by 2,2 
points, together with 6,4% credit growth. So, it may be concluded that in this 
period, while private 2 banks increased their efficiency score by increasing output, 
i.e. loans, they incurred more risks through expanding loans to customers with 
high probability of default, a finding supported by increased NPLR. 
   In overall, banking sector’s risk taking measure is above zero whereas smaller 
than 1 in 2003-2010 period. This indicates that from 2003 to 2010, Turkish 
banking sector incurred moderate risks with decline in its NPLR, while expanding 
loans. In fact, for a developing country, this could be considered as an indicator of 
healthy growth of banking sector.  
  When we divide time period under consideration into two, we observe that in 
the pre crisis period (2003-2007), banking sector’s risk taking measure is positive 
but in the post crisis period it is negative depending on the reduced efficiency 
scores. During pre crisis period, moderate credit growth rates were accompanied 
by reduced NPLRs. So, it can be concluded that although the risk level of Turkish 
banks increased, banks were able to monitor and manage expanded loans in 
2003-2007. This fact could explain quick recovery of Turkish banking sector from 
2007 financial crisis. The highest risk taking measure belongs to private 1 banks 
and the lowest risk taking measure belongs to public banks in pre crisis period. 
  On the contrary, during post crisis period (2007-2010), we observe decline in 
risk taking measures. However, although risk taking measures decreased in post 
crisis period both for the sector and on a bank by bank basis,  lower credit growth 
rates accompanied by increases in NPLRs in private 2, private 3 and private 4 Müge DİLER 116
banks. So, it may be inferred that following the 2007 global financial crisis, banks 
began to contract their previously expanded credits and suffered from higher 
NPLRs in 2010 compared to 2007. The contraction in credits brought relatively 
more secure balance sheets to banks and decreased their efficiency due to the 
trade-off between efficiency and riskiness. In other words, banks had come up 
with healthier financial statements in return for reduced growth and hence, 
efficiency in the post crisis period. 
5 5.4. Two-Stage Regression Analysis 
  Based on Laeven (1997), Coelli et al. (1998), Sufian (2009) and McDonald 
(2009) to explain the variation in changes in output efficiencies through time a 
two-stage ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is specified as a fixed 
effects model: 
* ˆ
k T   =b0  +b1ROA  +b2LNTA  +b3LOANSTA  +b4NPLTA(-1)    
+b5CAR  +b6DLNRGDP  +b7NIM  +b8INF  +b9LNDEP+ei 
  I n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n ,  r e t u r n  o n  a s s e t s  ( R O A )  i s  u s e d  a s  a  p r o x y  f o r  b a n k  
profitability, logarithm of total loans (LNTA) is used as a proxy of bank size to 
capture the possible cost advantages associated with size, namely, economies of 
scale. The ratio of loans to total assets (LOANSTA) is used as an indicator for bank 
liquidity which is an indication of bank’s ability to meet its customers’ day-to-day 
cash needs and respond to sudden cash withdrawals. The ratio of nonperforming 
loans to total assets with one period lag (NPLTA(-1)) is used as an indicator of risk 
in case banks extend their loans. Since the ratio is expected to have impacts on 
banks’ balance sheet with a time lag we take the ratio with a one period lag. 
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is used as a proxy for capital adequacy and a cushion 
against future losses. Logarithm of real gross domestic product growth 
(DLNRGDP) and inflation (INF) are employed as a proxy for economic conditions. 
Logarithm of deposits (LNDEP) is used as a proxy of market share. On the other 
hand, dependent variable is assumed to be the bootstrapped bank efficiency 
scores obtained in the first step, in the previous section. This is why regression 
analysis is called two-stage in the literature. 
  Annual panel data from 2003 to 2010, for 22 commercial banks is used in the 
regression. Regression is run by assuming fixed effects model, instead of random Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 117
effects model. The advantage of fixed effects model is that it imposes time 
independent bank specific effects that are possibly correlated with regressors 
whereas random effect model assumes no fixed, individual effects for banks. In 
other words, fixed effect models controls for the unobserved heterogeneity in the 
sample when this heterogeneity is constant over time and correlated with 
independent variables. In fixed effects model time independent bank specific 
effects can be removed from the data through differencing, for example, taking 
the first difference will remove any time invariant components of the model. So, 
to take into account the impacts of bank specific effects, we use fixed effects 
model. Table below summarizes OLS regression results. (see Appendix B for more 
detailed regression results). 
T Table 6: Two-Stage Regression Analysis 
 
  According to the regression results, CAR and INF are insignificant whereas the 
rest of the variables are significant in a statistical sense. So, the effects of those 
variables are ignorable in the evaluation of DEA efficiency scores.   
  The results suggest that ROA has the largest impact in the determination of 
DEA efficiency scores. Following this variable, DLNRGDP and NPLTA(-1) have the 
largest impacts on the efficiency scores among other variables. That’s to say, 1 
unit increase in ROA, i.e. profitability, increases efficiency score by 1,8 units. This 
implies that more profitable banks tend to exhibit higher efficiency. Also, banks 
reporting higher profitability ratios are usually preferred by clients and attract the 
larger share of deposits and it would be easier for those banks to find funding 
sources in international markets. Such conditions would obviously create a 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistics Prob.
C 1,153 0.158160 7,289 0.0000
ROA 1,831 0.594996 3,078 0.0026
LNTA -0,133 0.031347 -4,226 0.0000
LOANSTA -0,143 0.038402 -3,733 0.0003
NPLTA(-1) -1,106 0.426295 -2,594 0.0106
CAR -0,084 0.072124 -1,159 0.2486
DLNRGDPSA -1,311 0.200330 -6,545 0.0000
NIM -0,062 0.007385 -8,370 0.0000
INF -0,006 0.003175 -1,729 0.0863
LNDEP 0,143 0.032955 4,351 0.0000Müge DİLER 118
favorable environment for profitable banks to be more efficient in terms of 
intermediation activities.   
  It is expected that the demand for financial services tends to grow as 
economies expand and households become wealthier. However, it is observed 
that DLNRGDP is statistically significant and has negative sign. Hence, a 1 unit 
increase in DLNRGDP, decreases efficiency score by 1,3 units. The explanation 
could be that during the period under consideration, Turkey experienced volatile 
growth rates, ranging from 6,2% annual growth in 2001 to 9,4% in 2004, falling 
into a recession with growth rate of -4,8% in 2009 before covering to 9% in 
2010, annually. Therefore, the volatile economic growth could have resulted in 
banks to suffer from lower demand for their financial services, increased loan 
defaults, and thus lower output.   
  Another factor which could explain Turkish banks’ efficiency is non performing 
loans to total assets ratio. It is observed that a 1 unit increase in NPLTA(-1) 
decreases efficiency by 1,1 units, as expected. This implies that higher the amount 
of loan defaults lower the efficiency for that bank. So, banks should carefully 
monitor the counter party before extending its loans.   
  LNTA is statistically significant and has negative sign. So, one could argue that 
the larger the size of a bank, the more inefficient the bank would be. So, 
economies of scale argument does not hold for the Turkish banks. The possible 
explanation could be that Turkish banks are already in the decreasing returns to 
scale portion of their long run average cost curve.    
  LOANSTA is also statistically significant and has negative sign. The finding 
implies that the banks with higher loans to asset ratio tend to have lower 
efficiency scores. This finding could also be supported by the previous findings on 
LNTA and NPLTA(-1). That’s to say, as banks extend their loans, due to the 
decreasing returns to scale their efficiency would decrease, moreover, if banks do 
not monitor their customers carefully while increasing loans, they would probably 
suffer from the loan defaults and hence nonperforming loans. Bearing in mind 
that, ROA is positively related with efficiency, it could be argued that banks could 
increase their efficiency by investing various instruments, and by decreasing their 
concentration into relatively riskier loans, especially in crisis times. Furthermore, 
Figure-1 and Figure-3 combined with table in Appendix A.1. also suggest that the Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 119
banks which decrease their loan growth rates during crisis periods suffer less and 
so have greater efficiency and productivity scores.     
  LNDEP is statistically significant and has positive sign, suggesting that the more 
efficient banks are associated by larger market share. The possible explanation 
could be that banks could increase their efficiency by obtaining funds from market 
and so by increasing their deposit share, and then investing those funds to 
profitable instruments, other than risky loans in risky periods.   
  NIM, namely, spread between loan and deposit rates is statistically significant 
and has negative sign. There is no a priori expectation for the sign of this variable; 
it could either be positive or negative depending on the balance sheet position 
and the amount of interest sensitive assets and liabilities of the banking sector. For 
Turkish banks, it is observed that as spread increases, efficiency decreases. 
6. Conclusion  
  A linear programming technique called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) is used to estimate the efficiency and 
productivity of 22 commercial deposit banks in Turkey for the years 2003-2010. 
Given the data set, banks are divided into five groups as public banks, private 1, 2, 
3 and private 4 banks, according to their scale and size, placing the largest private 
banks into private 1 group and smallest banks into private 4. The bank grouping 
employed in this paper is the bank peer grouping developed especially for ratio 
analysis by BRSA in internal reporting systems. However, it is important to note 
that the appropriateness of this peer grouping is debatable for different input and 
output combinations, other than ratios.   
  In the estimation of efficiency, output oriented VRS DEA model is used. Inputs 
and outputs are determined according to the mixed approach in banking 
literature. The inputs used are the ratio of securities to total assets, the ratio of 
deposits to total assets, the ratio of nonperforming loans (gross) to total (cash) 
loans, the ratio of total loans to total assets and the ratio of non interest expense 
to total (average) assets. The outputs used are the ratio of net interest income to 
total income, return on (average) assets and return on (average) equity.   
  We then extend the established literature on the estimation of DEA efficiency 
scores by recognizing the problem of the inherent dependency of DEA efficiency Müge DİLER 120
scores when used in the regression analysis or when used to make statistical 
inferences. To overcome the dependency problem, we follow the approach 
suggested by Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000) and apply a bootstrapping technique 
to our DEA efficiency scores. Bootstrapping allows us to assess the statistical 
significance of the efficiency scores obtained. Results reveal that our estimates are 
statistically significant and could be used in statistical inference making, i.e. in the 
regression analysis.      
  It is observed that except public and private 4 banks, efficiency scores of all 
bank groups had increased uninterruptedly and gradually up to 2008. And bank 
groups’ efficiency scores began to converge each other, with private 4 banks 
being an exception due to the lower efficiency scores during this period. However, 
due to the impacts of 2007 global financial crisis, all bank groups’ efficiency scores 
decreased 2008 onwards, with private 4 banks having the poorest performance. 
Banks’ efficiency scores began to diverge from each other in 2010 compared to 
2008. Also, it is observed that the bank groups that continued to keep pre-crisis 
loan growth rates are the banks that suffer most in crisis period.   
  To measure the change in total factor productivity between two time periods, 
output oriented MPI is used. Bootstrapping technique is also applied to the MPI to 
get unbiased productivity scores. The advantage of MPI is that unlike alternative 
productivity indices, MPI does not require any information of prices of inputs and 
outputs. It is observed that productivity of all bank groups, except private 4 banks, 
increased continuously during 2003-2007, cumulatively. During this period, private 
1 group banks became the best performer whereas private 4 banks became the 
worst performer among all bank groups. As in the case in efficiency, our findings 
on productivity are also supported by the 2007 global financial crisis. Sharp 
decreases in productivity scores of all bank groups are observed 2007 onwards. 
The best performers of post-crisis periods became public and private 1 banks that 
have productivity scores above the sector’s average. Also, it is found that technical 
change i.e. shift of production frontier further away rather than efficiency change 
i.e. getting closer to the production frontier is more responsive to the financial 
crisis and is the main determinant of bank productivity.   
  To measure risk-taking levels of Turkish banks a risk measure based on the 
studies of Laeven (1997) and Aras and Kurt (2007) is introduced into the analysis. Efficiency, Productivity and Risk Analysis in Turkish Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach 121
The measure indicates that in the pre crisis period banking sector’s risk taking 
measure is positive but in the post crisis period it is negative depending on the 
reduced efficiency scores. However, during the pre crisis period, moderate credit 
growth rates were accompanied by reduced NPLRs. This implies that although 
Turkish banking sector incurred risks in this period, the risks were well-managed 
and monitored.   
  Finally, to analyze the determinants of bootstrapped DEA efficiency scores 
obtained in the first stage of the analysis, a two-stage (second-step) fixed effects 
regression model is estimated. The model controls for bank heterogeneity and 
endogeneity issues by adopting the two-stage ordinary least square estimation of 
fixed effects. In the regression, annual panel data set for 22 commercial banks, 
during 2003-2010 is used. It is found that return on assets has the largest positive 
impact on the efficiency whereas GDP growth and the ratio of nonperforming 
loans to total assets have the largest negative impact on efficiency scores, 
respectively.    
  To sum up, this study observes that during 2003-2008, efficiency and 
productivity of Turkish banking sector had improved gradually and 
uninterruptedly, however in 2008-2009 sudden decreases in efficiency and 
productivity are detected. From 2009 to 2010, we, however, observe gradual 
recovery. Our findings are strongly supported by the September, 2007 global 
financial crisis that was also experienced in Turkey. In overall, it can be concluded 
that by the end of 2010, the impacts of crisis on Turkish banking sector have 
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A APPENDIX A.1 
Summary of Data for 22 Commercial Banks (2003-2010) 
(Million TL) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Growth (%)
NON PERFORMING LOANS (2003-2010)
PUBLIC 3.531 1.601 1.516 1.405 1.424 1.856 2.523 2.613 -26,0
PRIVATE 1 3.055 3.264 4.151 5.110 6.230 7.743 11.490 9.753 219,2
PRIVATE 2 344 489 712 886 1.428 2.445 4.810 4.746 1.279,9
PRIVATE 3 188 194 361 406 387 723 1.176 1.118 494,6
PRIVATE 4 28 27 27 28 51 106 211 181 547,4
TOTAL 7.146 5.575 6.767 7.835 9.519 12.872 20.210 18.410 157,6
PUBLIC 40.813 53.225 54.164 58.839 59.188 73.920 88.724 92.678 127,1
PRIVATE 1 47.412 52.636 68.952 83.330 84.560 95.912 143.475 157.709 232,6
PRIVATE 2 6.968 7.115 8.721 9.186 12.581 14.213 17.284 22.512 223,1
PRIVATE 3 2.457 2.489 2.595 3.254 2.456 4.162 5.014 5.046 105,4
PRIVATE 4 399 388 439 479 1.717 2.145 2.128 2.086 422,8
TOTAL 98.049 115.853 134.872 155.089 160.502 190.352 256.626 280.030 185,6
PUBLIC 47.353 64.397 72.094 84.961 96.644 120.569 139.265 173.965 267,4
PRIVATE 1 76.245 90.284 125.625 159.549 182.850 236.645 264.663 312.199 309,5
PRIVATE 2 16.297 22.101 27.648 39.152 47.366 57.358 62.723 74.608 357,8
PRIVATE 3 5.315 6.037 6.926 10.156 11.816 15.650 16.124 18.180 242,0
PRIVATE 4 785 772 996 1.407 1.835 2.808 3.201 3.435 337,3
TOTAL 145.995 183.591 233.290 295.225 340.512 433.030 485.976 582.386 298,9
PUBLIC 1.558 2.058 2.334 2.964 3.482 3.153 5.142 5.723 267,2
PRIVATE 1 2.443 2.672 641 5.055 7.752 6.760 10.667 12.201 399,4
PRIVATE 2 628 679 1.256 1.584 1.544 1.339 1.936 2.049 226,2
PRIVATE 3 132 160 221 205 467 378 423 422 218,6
PRIVATE 4 22 17 18 20 23 26 50 45 98,9
TOTAL 4.785 5.585 4.471 9.827 13.268 11.656 18.219 20.440 327,2
PUBLIC 4.854 4.974 3.783 4.771 5.342 5.953 8.562 7.957 63,9
PRIVATE 1 3.142 7.843 9.230 10.307 12.544 14.317 20.724 19.252 512,7
PRIVATE 2 1.399 2.221 2.919 3.399 4.454 5.836 7.338 6.794 385,5
PRIVATE 3 227 586 706 808 1.219 1.527 1.609 1.325 483,1
PRIVATE 4 94 78 76 77 124 196 235 211 124,0
TOTAL 9.717 15.703 16.714 19.363 23.684 27.829 38.468 35.539 265,7
PUBLIC 3.917 3.362 2.375 3.034 3.192 4.468 4.588 4.727 20,7
PRIVATE 1 8.101 9.776 13.308 12.027 14.575 18.261 20.565 19.030 134,9
PRIVATE 2 2.278 3.113 3.276 4.275 5.585 8.315 9.406 8.956 293,2
PRIVATE 3 699 841 999 1.271 1.570 1.968 1.947 1.747 149,9
PRIVATE 4 113 121 114 140 157 290 322 393 248,3
TOTAL 15.108 17.212 20.072 20.746 25.080 33.302 36.827 34.852 130,7
PUBLIC 7.386 12.864 19.523 28.289 38.689 54.954 67.191 99.564 1.248,1
PRIVATE 1 36.035 53.259 82.215 122.384 156.222 203.801 205.190 273.729 659,6
PRIVATE 2 11.221 19.150 28.596 41.722 53.780 63.748 65.670 83.225 641,7
PRIVATE 3 2.657 4.124 5.241 8.017 11.055 12.265 13.508 17.372 553,9
PRIVATE 4 322 486 725 1.079 1.530 2.025 2.499 3.376 949,5
TOTAL 57.620 89.883 136.301 201.491 261.276 336.793 354.057 477.266 728,3
PUBLIC 66.016 82.704 92.103 107.241 121.389 155.734 185.594 224.448 240,0
PRIVATE 1 120.988 148.518 208.814 268.804 309.205 388.536 444.230 528.425 336,8
PRIVATE 2 26.644 37.466 50.138 68.467 83.610 103.756 106.324 132.181 396,1
PRIVATE 3 7.733 9.516 11.165 17.646 18.922 23.631 23.564 29.052 275,7
PRIVATE 4 1.490 1.720 2.031 2.664 4.490 6.124 6.994 7.832 425,6
TOTAL 222.872 279.924 364.251 464.822 537.615 677.782 766.706 921.938 313,7
PUBLIC 8.401 8.056 8.993 10.359 11.601 11.650 16.114 20.903 148,8
PRIVATE 1 17.792 23.688 25.869 28.977 38.218 42.651 56.648 69.930 293,0
PRIVATE 2 3.903 5.013 6.137 7.310 9.934 11.982 14.312 16.872 332,3
PRIVATE 3 798 1.084 1.339 1.746 2.539 3.106 3.635 4.050 407,6
PRIVATE 4 252 301 316 372 565 883 1.091 1.129 347,8
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Year Statistics Public Private 1 Private 2 Private 3 Private 4 Year Statistics Public Private 1 Private 2 Private 3 Private 4
mean 2.61 2.15 2.75 1.71 1.91 mean 71.61 63.82 61.71 66.11 48.40
std dev 0.03 1.73 0.85 1.07 0.33 std dev 0.43 5.29 8.97 10.15 26.97
mean 2.66 2.00 2.03 1.56 1.24 mean 77.24 61.24 59.60 60.97 41.60
std dev 0.27 1.46 0.59 1.18 0.66 std dev 2.35 5.89 8.46 7.78 21.96
mean 2.55 -0.51 2.83 2.12 1.18 mean 77.53 62.24 55.66 59.56 44.30
std dev 0.71 6.61 1.17 1.70 0.64 std dev 2.58 7.13 6.48 11.94 24.99
mean 2.92 2.19 2.36 1.51 0.83 mean 78.21 59.87 57.49 57.02 46.12
std dev 0.29 0.58 1.50 0.49 0.91 std dev 4.05 3.66 7.51 12.25 26.48
mean 3.08 2.69 1.98 2.53 0.54 mean 77.96 59.79 56.68 61.68 37.50
std dev 0.04 0.93 0.86 0.70 0.41 std dev 7.03 4.15 6.58 6.65 17.18
mean 2.30 1.92 1.37 1.69 0.63 mean 76.88 61.57 55.06 63.77 40.82
std dev 0.11 0.32 0.29 0.82 0.66 std dev 2.25 4.94 7.17 10.09 23.13
mean 3.00 2.58 1.73 1.76 0.98 mean 73.39 60.05 58.40 67.22 43.15
std dev 0.10 0.51 0.65 0.95 1.30 std dev 6.82 4.12 6.07 4.22 26.14
mean 2.88 2.52 1.50 1.51 0.88 mean 75.55 59.20 55.23 62.03 40.94
std dev 0.11 0.50 0.94 0.90 1.08 std dev 7.98 4.66 4.30 5.58 26.95
mean 21.00 16.57 18.61 19.42 9.60 mean 32.17 8.02 3.00 6.24 9.92
std dev 0.03 10.62 5.40 13.72 1.78 std dev 0.76 5.23 1.70 5.16 8.61
mean 24.76 16.77 15.24 16.97 6.26 mean 13.20 5.92 2.52 3.99 5.67
std dev 7.47 15.79 4.91 16.32 2.98 std dev 12.64 3.09 1.64 2.74 5.24
mean 26.32 -0.72 21.99 16.24 6.10 mean 9.29 5.35 2.44 5.94 3.81
std dev 12.42 43.83 8.92 8.17 3.51 std dev 9.88 2.79 1.48 5.95 3.09
mean 31.47 20.66 21.37 14.33 5.62 mean 5.28 4.20 2.08 4.21 2.74
std dev 7.79 5.82 12.57 5.97 6.68 std dev 4.84 2.16 1.06 4.17 2.13
mean 39.48 27.37 18.71 25.57 4.03 mean 3.66 3.99 2.63 3.25 2.90
std dev 6.32 13.51 6.33 8.72 4.53 std dev 2.59 1.49 1.06 1.78 1.69
mean 33.26 19.17 13.30 14.22 3.53 mean 3.37 3.75 3.78 5.29 4.06
std dev 7.59 3.73 3.60 7.09 3.19 std dev 1.97 1.11 1.33 2.91 2.10
mean 44.91 23.71 15.05 13.47 4.32 mean 3.68 5.36 6.89 8.13 5.93
std dev 8.46 3.85 7.40 7.71 4.22 std dev 1.88 0.97 2.56 5.12 4.02
mean 37.07 21.46 12.89 10.57 3.82 mean 2.69 3.49 5.24 6.15 4.13
std dev 1.25 3.69 8.82 6.38 3.20 std dev 1.68 0.92 2.23 3.61 2.09
mean 27.35 11.64 27.40 12.62 38.24 mean 11.67 30.02 40.57 35.98 22.93
std dev 3.72 12.74 10.23 16.35 13.91 std dev 1.65 4.12 6.28 7.81 19.29
mean 32.94 31.80 34.67 29.10 34.49 mean 15.87 36.17 48.50 44.57 27.60
std dev 5.52 9.42 5.48 9.32 16.37 std dev 1.17 3.40 9.77 6.72 14.84
mean 25.99 33.57 37.61 32.70 32.66 mean 21.68 40.63 54.86 49.02 34.42
std dev 7.00 4.15 2.86 5.99 6.98 std dev 1.67 5.99 5.56 10.45 16.32
mean 28.49 28.03 31.97 31.21 22.92 mean 28.10 46.34 60.67 50.48 38.46
std dev 5.08 2.24 3.57 6.95 6.05 std dev 6.85 5.65 5.49 14.50 17.59
mean 27.42 26.50 32.53 33.90 28.51 mean 34.89 51.40 62.26 60.08 36.99
std dev 3.04 2.99 3.25 1.71 5.33 std dev 12.80 5.97 5.47 10.44 20.29
mean 26.46 26.07 32.51 35.25 31.95 mean 38.71 53.20 59.66 51.89 34.79
std dev 0.70 1.64 6.26 3.06 12.10 std dev 14.19 4.45 3.31 5.78 13.70
mean 37.97 37.70 41.45 41.17 38.45 mean 40.18 47.41 59.77 59.62 37.57
std dev 2.21 2.76 5.88 3.00 15.64 std dev 16.44 6.66 2.16 12.37 16.76
mean 37.14 35.67 41.23 39.11 35.19 mean 48.22 52.93 61.06 61.56 43.74
std dev 3.87 2.44 7.41 5.91 14.92 std dev 15.74 6.66 4.46 14.35 13.89
mean 62.90 38.59 24.34 28.98 29.17 mean 6.47 7.60 10.14 9.87 9.48
std dev 3.67 8.83 10.96 14.75 18.86 std dev 0.25 1.35 3.14 3.59 3.37
mean 65.06 34.70 18.32 23.68 24.94 mean 4.48 7.29 9.68 9.16 8.15
std dev 2.63 7.37 7.11 9.59 18.94 std dev 0.01 0.76 2.32 2.74 1.57
mean 59.96 31.82 17.88 21.95 24.49 mean 2.92 8.67 7.58 8.99 6.63
std dev 3.95 5.15 5.39 10.78 19.02 std dev 0.46 7.18 1.69 3.46 1.47
mean 53.49 30.48 14.20 17.09 21.95 mean 3.23 5.51 7.03 9.18 6.10
std dev 5.51 3.47 7.10 9.23 16.31 std dev 0.69 2.06 1.33 2.59 1.99
mean 45.93 26.84 15.73 11.47 29.79 mean 3.05 5.12 7.50 8.31 5.31
std dev 11.99 4.61 7.02 5.74 18.29 std dev 0.94 1.45 1.00 2.32 1.55
mean 44.05 24.09 13.46 15.88 26.71 mean 3.58 5.22 8.60 8.43 7.32
std dev 14.17 4.38 4.06 7.54 19.24 std dev 1.29 0.65 1.52 2.39 4.16
mean 44.18 31.18 16.44 18.59 26.24 mean 2.91 5.11 9.03 7.98 5.53
std dev 15.00 8.82 4.19 7.21 17.45 std dev 0.87 0.92 0.93 1.37 1.77
mean 37.44 28.84 16.84 15.66 22.80 mean 2.53 4.11 7.81 6.76 5.65




























































































































































































































































A APPENDIX B 
Two-Stage Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: DEA     
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)   
    
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2010     
Periods included: 7     
Cross-sections included: 22     
Total panel (balanced) observations: 154   
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C  1.152867 0.158160 7.289246 0.0000 
ROA  1.831185 0.594996 3.077644 0.0026 
LNTA -0.132482  0.031347  -4.226245  0.0000 
LOANSTA -0.143336  0.038402  -3.732504  0.0003 
NPLTA(-1) -1.105745  0.426295  -2.593846  0.0106 
CAR -0.083616  0.072124  -1.159343  0.2486 
DLNRGDPSA -1.311146  0.200330  -6.544938  0.0000 
NIM -0.061812  0.007385  -8.370306  0.0000 
INF -0.005489  0.003175  -1.728893  0.0863 
LNDEP  0.143402 0.032955 4.351479 0.0000 
 Effects  Specification     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)   
 Weighted  Statistics     
R-squared  0.666057      Mean dependent var  1.198761 
Adjusted R-squared  0.584607      S.D. dependent var  0.643462 
S.E. of regression  0.089723      Sum squared resid  0.990177 
F-statistic  8.177534      Durbin-Watson stat  2.148322 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000       
 Unweighted  Statistics     
R-squared  0.529470      Mean dependent var  0.796668 
Sum squared resid  1.068311      Durbin-Watson stat  1.949412 
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